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I. INTRODUCTION
This article adds to the growing library of analysis and commentary
1
on Minnesota family law. It surveys, reviews, analyzes, and comments
1. See generally Bradley J. Betlach, The Unconstitutionality of the Minnesota
Defense of Marriage Act: Ignoring Judgments, Restricting Travel and Purposeful
Discrimination, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 407 (1998); Kathleen A. Blatz, A Minnesota
Comparative Family Law Symposium, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 493 (2001); Kathleen
Blatz, Children and the Law: Keeping an Eye on the Child, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
625 (2000); Rochelle Bobroff, Judicial Deference to Federal Government Erodes
Medicaid Protections for Elderly Spouses Impoverished by the High Costs of Nursing
Home Care, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 159 (2002); William Forsberg, Partners in Life
and at Death: The New Minnesota Elective Share of a Surviving Spouse Statute, 23 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 377 (1997); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The
Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV.
637 (1999); Brian J. Guidera, Concurrent Permanency Planning: Implementation in
Hennepin County, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 699 (2000); Susan Harris, Open Hearings:
A Questionable Solution, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 673 (2000); Brent R. Lindahl,
Insurance Coverage for an Innocent Co-Insured Spouse, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433
(1997); David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86
MINN. L. REV. 791 (2002); Allison Morse, Comment, Social Science in the Courtroom:
Expert Testimony and Battered Women, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 287 (1998); Tiernee L.
Nelsen, Recent Development, Family Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1311 (2000);
Robert E. Oliphant, Redefining a Statute Out of Existence: Minnesota’s View of When a
Custody Modification Hearing Can Be Held, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 711 (2000);
Theresa A. Peterson, Note, The State of Child Custody in Minnesota: Why Minnesota
Should Enact the Parenting Plan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577 (1999);
Jane Ranum, Minnesota’s Permanency and Concurrent Planning Child Welfare System,
26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 687 (2000); Heidi S. Schellhas, Open Child Protection
Proceedings in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 631 (2000); Lawrence Schlam,
Third Party Custody Disputes in Minnesota: Overcoming the “Natural Rights” of
Parents or Pursuing the “Best Interests” of Children?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 733
(2000); Nancy Ver Steegh, The Silent Victims: Children and Domestic Violence, 26 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 775 (2000); Victor I. Vieth, In My Neighbor’s House: A Proposal to
Address Child Abuse in Rural America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 143 (1998); Victor I. Vieth,
Passover in Minnesota: Mandated Reporting and the Unequal Protection of Abused
Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 131 (1998); Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help
Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act and its Continued Implementation in
Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811 (2000); Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1003 (2002); Tsippi Wray, Lesbian Relationships and Parenthood:
Models for Legal Recognition of Nontraditional Families, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 127
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on the decisions of Minnesota’s appellate courts in the sometimes
challenging and always interesting areas of subject matter and personal
2
jurisdiction.
The article examines many of the more common issues associated
with jurisdiction that impact Minnesota family law in the areas of child
support, custody, property division, maintenance, and paternity. It
investigates the jurisdictional questions involved when applying
3
Minnesota’s long-arm statute and weighs the potential constitutional
4
barriers to its application. It also examines relevant provisions of the
5
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) , the Uniform Child
6
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), the Indian Child
7
Welfare Act (ICWA), the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
8
9
(UIFSA), and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Relief Act. There is a brief
review of subject matter issues associated with bringing family lawsuits
10
in federal court.
Decisions from other jurisdictions are used and
discussed where appropriate. Throughout the article one will find
suggestions for improving the language of some of Minnesota’s statutes
that impact jurisdiction, as well as additional suggestions for
reconsidering some of the statutory language applied by Minnesota’s
courts to jurisdiction disputes.
II. SUBJECT MATTER—GENERALLY
It is axiomatic that a court must possess subject matter jurisdiction
to hear any portion of a family law dispute; otherwise, it is powerless to
proceed. It also goes without saying that a court must possess personal

(1997).
2. See, e.g., Len Biernat, A Minnesota Comparative Family Law Symposium,
Forces Changing Family Law in Minnesota, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 873 (2001); Misti
N. Nelc, Inequitable Distribution: The Effect of Minnesota’s Child Support Guidelines on
Prior And Subsequent Children, 17 LAW & INEQ. 97 (Winter, 1999); Robert E. Oliphant,
Redefining a Statute Out of Existence: Minnesota’s View of When a Custody Modification
Hearing Can Be Held, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 711 (2000); Robert E. Oliphant, Is
Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interstate Family Law Act,
21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989 (1996).
3. See infra Part XVII.
4. See infra Part XVIII.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000); see infra Part XXII.
6. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518D.101-317 (2002); see infra Part XX.
7. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000); see infra Part XXI.
8. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.101-902 (2002); see infra Part XIX.
9. 50 U.S.C §§ 501-591 (2000); see infra Part XXIII.
10. See infra Part XXIV.
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jurisdiction over both parties if it is to make a binding order imposing
personal obligations on them such as maintenance, child support, or
attorneys’ fees. Where both parties cannot be found, a court may still
dissolve a marriage so long as it has jurisdiction over one of them and
appropriate efforts are made to provide notice of the action to the other
11
spouse.
The general principles associated with the exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction are well known. Subject-matter jurisdiction is described as
the court’s power to hear and determine the general subject involved in
12
the action. Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by failing to
13
Furthermore, subject matter
raise it before, during, or after trial.
jurisdiction may be questioned at any time, even by the court sua sponte
for the first time on appeal because “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
14
conferred upon the court by consent of the parties.”
In the context of a family law dispute, Minnesota courts have
consistently stated that a judgment entered by a court without subject
15
matter jurisdiction is void. More precisely, they have declared that a
divorce granted absent satisfaction of certain residency requirements is
16
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, should a modern
court revisit this issue, it may well conclude that the residency provisions
are nothing more, in fact, than elements of a cause of action. The
reasons for this conclusion follow in the next section.
III. VOIDING A DIVORCE DECREE WHEN THE PARTIES
FAIL TO COMPLY WITH RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
Minnesota courts have not recently reassessed the implications of
voiding a divorce decree months or years after it was entered because the
statutory residency requirements were not met. They have continued to
17
rely upon a more-than-century-old decision, Thelan v. Thelan, to
11. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877).
12. See Duennow v. Lindeman, 223 Minn. 505, 511, 27 N.W.2d 421, 425 (1947)
(defining subject matter jurisdiction as the “authority to hear and determine the particular
questions the court assumes to decide”) (quoting Sache v. Wallace, 101 Minn. 169, 172,
112 N.W. 386, 387 (1907)).
13. Marzitelli v. City of Little Canada, 582 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn. 1998).
14. Herubin v. Finn, 603 N.W.2d 133, 137 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Hemmesch v. Molitor, 328 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. 1983)).
15. See, e.g., Thelan v. Thelan, 75 Minn. 433, 436, 78 N.W. 108, 109 (1899).
16. Wyman v. Wyman, 297 Minn. 465, 467, 212 N.W.2d 368, 369 (1973) (“A
divorce granted without complying with the statute is void for lack of jurisdiction”); see
also Thelan, 75 Minn. at 436, 78 N.W. at 109.
17. Thelan, 75 Minn. at 433, 78 N.W. at 108.
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support the proposition that failure to meet residency requirements is the
18
However, a
equivalent of an absence of subject matter jurisdiction.
reasonable argument can be made that the residence provisions contained
19
in the Minnesota Statutes have been historically misunderstood.
Support for this view is found in the Minnesota Constitution and in
20
the Minnesota legislature’s grant of subject matter jurisdiction.
The
language in these provisions is significantly different from that found in
Minnesota Statutes section 518.07, which Minnesota courts have used to
support the voidness theory.
The Minnesota Constitution contains the following language that
provides district courts with subject matter jurisdiction: “The district
court has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and shall
21
have appellate jurisdiction as prescribed by law.” The legislature, in
response to this constitutional provision, enacted the following:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all civil
actions within their respective districts, in all cases of crime
committed or triable therein, in all special proceedings not
exclusively cognizable by some other court or tribunal, and in
all other cases wherein such jurisdiction is especially conferred
upon them by law. They shall also have appellate jurisdiction
in every case in which an appeal thereto is allowed by law
22
from any other court, officer, or body.
Minnesota Statutes section 518.07, upon which the view of subject
matter in a dissolution action rests, reads as follows:
No dissolution shall be granted unless (1) one of the parties has
resided in this state, or has been a member of the armed
services stationed in this state, for not less than 180 days
immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding;
or (2) one of the parties has been a domiciliary of this state for
not less than 180 days immediately preceding commencement
23
of the proceeding.
Although one can argue that the phrase in chapter 484 declaring that
courts have jurisdiction when it is “especially conferred on them by law”
makes section 518.07 a subject matter statute, one can also argue that had
18. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ladd, No. C0-99-710, 1999 WL 994023 (Minn. Ct.
App. Nov. 2, 1999) (citing Thelan, 75 Minn. at 436, 78 N.W. at 109).
19. See MINN. STAT. § 518.07 (2002).
20. See MINN. STAT. § 484, subd. 1 (2002).
21. MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
22. MINN. STAT. § 484, subd. 1 (2002).
23. MINN. STAT. § 518.07 (2002).
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the legislature intended that Minnesota Statutes section 518.07 be
jurisdictional, it would have included specific language to that effect in
the statute. While the underlying purpose of Minnesota Statutes section
518.07 is to establish residency requirements for commencing a
dissolution, there is no language suggesting that a failure to meet the
requirements divests a court of subject matter jurisdiction or that a
24
judgment entered without meeting the requirements is void.
The New York Court of Appeals considered a similar question in
25
Lacks v. Lacks. In the case, the plaintiff had obtained a divorce in New
26
Under New York law, one of the
York on the ground of cruelty.
27
parties to the divorce action must have resided in the state for one year.
Two years after the decree was entered, and after the time to appeal had
passed, the original defendant moved to vacate the judgment on the
ground that the court was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain
28
the action. She alleged that the plaintiff had not been a resident in New
York State for a full year preceding the commencement of the divorce
29
action as required by New York law and that the judgment was void.
In rejecting the claim, the court made a penetrating analysis of the
difference between a substantive element of a cause of action and subject
matter jurisdiction.
[T]he principal issue [is] whether an otherwise valid divorce
judgment depends, jurisdictionally, upon a correct
determination of the statutory residence requirements, that is,
24. See id.
25. 359 N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1976), re-argument denied, 362 N.E.2d 261 (N.Y. 1976).
26. Id. at 385-86.
27. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 1999). The entire New York statute,
regarding the required residence of parties reads:
An action to annul a marriage, or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, or
for divorce or separation may be maintained only when: 1. The parties were
married in the state and either party is a resident thereof when the action is
commenced and has been a resident for a continuous period of one year
immediately preceding, or 2. The parties have resided in this state as husband
and wife and either party is a resident thereof when the action is commenced
and has been a resident for a continuous period of one year immediately
preceding, or 3. The cause occurred in the state and either party has been a
resident thereof for a continuous period of at least one year immediately
preceding the commencement of the action, or 4. The cause occurred in the
state and both parties are residents thereof at the time of the commencement
of the action, or 5. Either party has been a resident of the state for a
continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the
commencement of the action.
28. Lacks, 359 N.W.2d at 386.
29. Id.
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whether the competence of the court depends upon a correct
determination of the residence requirements.
The confusion, if there be confusion, starts with a line of
decisions dating back to the last century and continuing into
the present in which this court has said with less than perfect
meticulousness that “jurisdiction” of New York courts in
matrimonial cases is limited to the powers conferred by statute
. . . . Jurisdiction is a word of elastic, diverse, and disparate
meanings.
A statement that a court lacks “jurisdiction” to decide a case
may, in reality, mean that elements of a cause of action are
absent . . . .
In Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., this court, in
discussing subject matter jurisdiction, drew a clear distinction
between a court’s competence to entertain an action and its
power to render a judgment on the merits. Absence of
competence to entertain an action deprives the court of
“subject matter jurisdiction”; absence of power to reach the
merits does not.
The implications of this distinction are serious. It is blackletter
law that a judgment rendered without subject matter
jurisdiction is void, and that the defect may be raised at any
time and may not be waived . . . . Thus stated, the rule is
grossly oversimple. The problem requires better analysis, and
one long overdue . . . . Nevertheless, the breadth with which
the rule is often stated indicates the importance traditionally
attached to so-called subject matter jurisdiction, really
competence of courts, and the grave consequences, including
denial of Res judicata effect to judgments, which may result
from a lack of true subject matter jurisdiction or competence.
Beyond the confusion engendered by a misapplication of the
terminology and concept of subject matter jurisdiction, there is
more created by the locution that in this State the courts’ power
in matrimonial actions is exclusively statutory. Yet in
counterpoint, it has often been said: “the Supreme Court is a
court of original, unlimited and unqualified jurisdiction” and
“competent to entertain all causes of action unless its
jurisdiction has been specifically proscribed.”
....
In sum, the overly stated principle that lack of subject matter
jurisdiction makes a final judgment absolutely void is not
applicable to cases which, upon analysis, do not involve
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jurisdiction, but merely substantive elements of a cause for
relief. To do so would be to undermine significantly the
doctrine of Res judicata, and to eliminate the certainty and
finality in the law and in litigation which the doctrine is
30
designed to protect.
The Lacks court concluded that proof of the requisite period of
residence was necessary to establish a cause of action for divorce but that
failure to make the proof did not strip the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Other jurisdictions considering somewhat similar issues appear to
31
For example, in Daly v.
agree with the New York court’s analysis.
32
Daly the Connecticut Court of Appeals rejected a subject matter
challenge to a nineteen-year-old judgment, saying:
[W]e have also recognized that “[t]he modern law of civil
procedure suggests that even litigation about subject matter
jurisdiction should take into account the importance of the
principle of the finality of judgments, particularly when the
parties have had a full opportunity originally to contest the
33
jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal.”
30. Lacks, 359 N.E.2d at 386-88 (citations omitted).
31. See Minto v. Lambert, 870 P.2d 572, 575-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (stating a
requirement of good faith negotiations before the commencement of condemnation
proceedings is not restriction on district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but merely
element of claim for relief); Vogel v. Vogel, 422 A.2d 271, 273 (Conn. 1979) (rejecting
attack on twenty-year-old dissolution judgment); People v. Jackson, 198 Cal. Rptr. 135,
139 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1983) (stating a statutory requirement governing
municipal and justice court jurisdiction; that the offense charged must be committed
within the county of such court was in the nature of non-fundamental, waivable
“territorial jurisdiction”). The court in B.J.P. v. R.W.P. stated:
A consideration of the “environment” in which the jurisdictional
issue arises in this case persuades us that the mother’s objections to
the trial court’s authority may be (and here have been) waived, and
that it would be inequitable to permit her to raise them for the first
time on appeal.
The purported lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on territorial
considerations—a fair characterization of the asserted defect here—
has been held to be analytically similar to improper venue; it does not
go to the power of the court to adjudicate the case, and may be
waived if not asserted in timely fashion.
637 A.2d 74, 78-79 (D.C. 1994).
32. 561 A.2d 951 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
33. Id. at 953 (citations omitted) (citing Meinket v. Levinson, 474 A.2d 454, 455-56
(Conn. 1984) (quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 413 A.2d 819 (Conn. 1979); Conn. Pharm.
Ass’n, v. Milano, 468 A.2d 1230 (Conn. 1983); Vogel v. Vogel, 422 A.2d 271 (Conn.
1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982); FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 13.16 (2d ed. 1977)); Morris v. Irwin, 494
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34

In Will of Brown, the court briefly discussed the due process
implications of the Lacks decision. Observed the court:
[A] defendant who had appeared in a New York divorce action
could not, after final judgment, collaterally attack the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court to make the decree as void in
New York or elsewhere on the basis that the plaintiff’s New
York residence had subsisted less than the one year or two year
period called for by the statute . . . so long as the plaintiff had
the minimal contacts with New York said to make the decree
enforceable under the full faith and credit clause.35
In conclusion, a reasonable argument can be made that the
residency requirement contained in Minnesota Statutes section 518.07 is
necessary to establish a cause of action for a divorce; however, the
failure to make the proof does not strip the court of subject matter
jurisdiction given to it by the Minnesota Constitution and Minnesota
Statutes chapter 484. It is suggested that the present construction given
by Minnesota’s courts should be reexamined. Alternatively, the
provision should be rewritten to prevent a dissolution judgment of many
years from being reopened solely on a theory that the courts lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. ELEMENTS OF A DISSOLUTION
Minnesota is a “no-fault” jurisdiction. Consequently, a marriage
dissolution may be granted without requiring that one party be at fault.
To “prove up” a dissolution petition, a party need only show that there
36
“has been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship.”
While the elements to establish a basis for divorce vary among the
37
states, Minnesota’s legislature allows a dissolution solely on this
A.2d 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985)).
34. 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (Sur. Ct., Kings County 1986).
35 Id.
36. MINN. STAT. § 518.06, subd. 1 (2002).
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-1(a)(1)-(12) (1993) (including grounds of
irretrievable breakdown, abandonment for one year, imprisonment for two years under
sentence of seven or more years, habitual drunkenness or drug addiction, insanity, nonsupport for two years); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.050(1)-(9) (Michie 1991) (listing, among
other grounds, incompatibility of temperament, adultery, and willful desertion for one
year); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(1)-(8) (Michie 1991) (including no fault, impotence,
cruel and barbarous treatment, and willful nonsupport); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West
1994) (requiring irremediable breakdown or incurable insanity); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46b-40, -51 (West 1986) (listing irretrievable breakdown, living apart for eighteen
months due to incompatibility); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992)
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(including irretrievable breakdown and mental incompetence for up to three years); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-5-3(1)-(13) (Harrison 1991) (listing irretrievable breakdown, adultery,
desertion for one year, mental incapacity at the time of the marriage, cruel treatment, and
incurable mental illness); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-603, -610 (Michie 1983) (including
irreconcilable differences and five years of separation); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401
(1999) (listing irretrievable breakdown, impotence, and adultery); IND. CODE. ANN. § 3115-1-2 (West 1997) (including irretrievable breakdown, conviction of a felony, incurable
insanity lasting for at least two years, impotency existing at the time of the marriage);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601(a) (1983) (including incompatibility and failure to perform a
material duty or obligation); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 103 (West Supp. 1992) (including
irretrievable breakdown and adultery); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 902(1) (West
1997) (requiring irreconcilable differences); MD. CODE ANN., FAM LAW § 7-103 (1991)
(listing one-year voluntary separation or two years living separate and apart, insanity,
adultery, or abandonment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, §§ 1, 1A (West 1992)
(including irretrievable breakdown and adultery, desertion for one year, or cruel and
abusive treatment); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 93-5-1 to -2 (1972 & Supp. 1990) (requiring
irreconcilable differences); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.320 (1986) (requiring irretrievable
breakdown for uncontested divorces; if contested, petitioner must show either period of
separation or fault); NEV. REV. STAT. 125.010 (1991) (including living separately for one
year, incompatibility, and insanity for two years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458:7, :7-a
(1992) (listing irreconcilable differences, extreme cruelty, absence for two years, or
joining a religious sect or society that believes the relation of husband and wife is
unlawful, and refusing to cohabit for six months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West
1987) (including eighteen months of separation in different habitation and no reasonable
prospect of reconciliation, as well as traditional fault such as adultery, willful desertion
for twelve or more months, and extreme mental or physical cruelty); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-4-1 (Michie 1993) (requiring incompatibility, abandonment, or adultery); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1988) (including living apart for one year pursuant to a
separation agreement, cruel and inhuman physical or mental treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 50-5.1, -6 (1987) (requiring living separate and apart for one year, or three years’
separation because of incurable insanity); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-05-03, -09.1 (1991)
(listing irreconcilable differences, willful neglect, habitual intemperance, and conviction
of a felony); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Anderson 1993 & Supp. 1991) (including
living separately for one year, bigamy, extreme cruelty, and any gross neglect of duty);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, 3 § 101 (West 1990) (listing incompatibility, abandonment for
one year, habitual drunkenness, and gross neglect of duty); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3301 (West 1991) (requiring irretrievable breakdown); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-2, -3
(1988) (listing irreconcilable differences, extreme cruelty, adultery, or any other gross
misbehavior and wickedness that is “repugnant to and in violation of the marriage
covenant”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1993) (including living apart for
one year, physical cruelty, and habitual drunkenness); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-1 to 18 (Michie 1992) (listing irreconcilable differences, adultery, extreme cruelty); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-101, -102 (1991) (including irreconcilable differences, impotence,
bigamy, adultery); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 6.001-.007 (Vernon 1998) (including
marriage that is insupportable because of discord or conflict of personalities that destroys
legitimate ends of the marriage relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of
reconciliation, living apart for three years, cruelty, and confinement in mental hospital for
three years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1(3) (1993) (including irreconcilable differences
and living apart for three consecutive years under a decree of separate maintenance
without cohabitation, physical or mental cruelty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1993)
(requiring resumption of marital relationship is not reasonably probable, willful desertion
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38

ground. An “irretrievable breakdown” has been construed to mean that
39
This provision
there is “no reasonable prospect of reconciliation.”
appears to accurately reflect current public policy, which is not to return
to a fault based system.
or absence); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992) (including living apart
as well as adultery, causing apprehension of bodily hurt); W. VA. CODE § 48-5-201
(2001) (listing irreconcilable differences, adultery, felony conviction, and habitual
drunkenness). Cf. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(2) (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 200 (1998) (requiring irretrievable breakdown). Several jurisdictions consider
only no-fault grounds. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West 1991) (requiring
irretrievable breakdown); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-110 (1987) (requiring irretrievable
breakdown); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1505 (1981) (defining irretrievable breakdown to
include some acts of misconduct); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-904 (1993) (requiring proof of
period of separation without reference to fault); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-41 (1985)
(defining “no fault” as either irretrievable breakdown or living apart for specified period);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.5(7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1991) (requiring irretrievable
breakdown); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.170 (Michie 1984) (requiring irretrievable
breakdown); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (West 1988) (requiring breakdown of
relationship); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (West 1990) (requiring irretrievable
breakdown); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104(b) (1991) (requiring irretrievable breakdown
with evidence of separation or serious discord); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-361 (1988)
(requiring irretrievable breakdown); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.025, .036 (1971) (requiring
irreconcilable differences; doctrine of fault abolished); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030
(1992) (requiring irretrievable breakdown); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.12(2) (West 1981 &
Supp. 1992) (requiring irretrievable breakdown); WYO. STAT. §§ 20-2-104, -105 (Michie
1987) (recognizing irreconcilable differences as well as traditional grounds such as
insanity).
38. The language of Minnesota’s dissolution statute reads as follows:
518.06. Dissolution of marriage; legal separation; grounds; uncontested legal
separation
Subdivision 1. A dissolution of marriage is the termination of the marital
relationship between a husband and wife. A decree of dissolution
completely terminates the marital status of both parties. A legal separation is
a court determination of the rights and responsibilities of a husband and wife
arising out of the marital relationship. A decree of legal separation does not
terminate the marital status of the parties. A dissolution of a marriage shall
be granted by a county or district court when the court finds that there has
been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage relationship.
A decree of legal separation shall be granted when the court finds that one or
both parties need a legal separation.
Defenses to divorce, dissolution and legal separation, including but not
limited to condonation, connivance, collusion, recrimination, insanity, and
lapse of time, are abolished.
Subd. 2. Repealed by Laws 1978, c. 772, § 63.
Subd. 3. If one or both parties petition for a decree of legal separation and
neither party contests the granting of the decree nor petitions for a decree of
dissolution, the court shall grant a decree of legal separation.
MINN. STAT. § 518.06 (2002).
39. MINN. STAT. § 518.13, subd. 2 (2002).
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V. LEGAL SEPARATION
A party seeking a legal separation is not bound by the same
40
For example,
requirements as one seeking a marriage dissolution.
actions for legal separation are exempt from the 180-day residence
41
requirement. Consequently, where a divorce claim cannot be proven
because of the 180-day residence barrier, a petition for a legal separation
can be filed and heard. In this proceeding a court may award child
support, maintenance, custody and attorneys’ fees and the separation
may later be converted to a divorce action. A court must, of course,
possess personal jurisdiction over both parties during the legal separation
proceeding to make an award of support or divide the couple’s personal
and real property.
VI. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
It was suggested earlier in this article that neither residence nor
domicile are jurisdictional prerequisites to Minnesota exercising subject
matter jurisdiction in a dissolution matter—they are merely elements of a
42
cause of action. Therefore, if the residency elements are successfully
challenged during a divorce proceeding, the action must be dismissed.
However, the failure to raise them should not automatically void the
judgment. This section of the article contains a brief analysis of the
distinction Minnesota’s courts and legislature have made between
“residence” and “domicile.”
Minnesota’s courts appear to have consistently applied wellaccepted principles of law when considering questions of domicile and
residence. For example, they have stated that “[d]omicile is the union of
43
residence and intention . . . .”
They have also stated that a legal
resident who temporarily lives in another state may still meet the
statutory requirements for domicile or residency if the Minnesota place
44
of domicile has not changed; “[i]f the change in physical presence is
made without intent to abandon the old home, domicile has not
45
changed.”
40. See Donigan v. Donigan, 236 Minn. 516, 521, 53 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1952).
41. MINN. STAT. § 518.10(d)(1) (1990).
42. See supra Part II.
43. Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1975).
44. Bechtel v. Bechtel, 101 Minn. 511, 515, 112 N.W. 883, 884 (1907) (holding
that wife, who was forced by husband to leave state, never intended to take up permanent
abode in other state and was considered legal resident).
45. Davidner, 304 Minn. at 494, 232 N.W.2d at 7 (holding husband’s move from
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The legislature has stated that the term “residence” is susceptible to
different interpretations depending upon the “context” in which it is
46
used. Given this definition, residence has sometimes functioned as the
equivalent of domicile while at other times it has meant only bodily
presence or temporary abode. The primary difference between these
terms concerns the intent of the individual. Generally, “residence” has
required only bodily presence whereas “domicile” has required presence
plus an intention to make a place one’s permanent home.
47
In Jones v. Jones, the court suggested that the purpose of a
residency requirement is to prevent nonresidents from coming into
48
Minnesota with their marital grievances; apparently it acts to prevent
the state from becoming a divorce mill.
Although Minnesota’s courts have encountered little difficulty
making a distinction between domicile and residence, it may be helpful if
the legislature were to incorporate the legal principles into two
definitions: one for residence and the other for domicile.
VII. DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
49

In Pennoyer v. Neff the United States Supreme Court stated that
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse is not necessary to
dissolve a marriage. This principle rests on the theory that every state
possesses jurisdiction to determine the civil status and capacities of all its
inhabitants and has the authority to prescribe the conditions on which
proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on within its
boundaries. Consequently, a state is viewed as having an absolute right
to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be
dissolved. When a state possesses in rem jurisdiction over the res or
“thing,” which is the marriage itself, and has in personam jurisdiction
over the plaintiff or petitioner, a valid ex parte divorce may be granted on
whatever basis a state sees fit. The decree is recognized as having
absolute and binding finality within the confines of its borders.

Minnesota to Utah for medical residency was only for definite period, and he formed no
intent to remain permanently in Utah).
46. MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subd. 1 (1990) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the
following terms have the meanings provided in this section unless the context clearly
requires otherwise”).
47. 402 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
48. Id. at 148.
49. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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The power to change the status of a state citizen has led to the
development of the “divisible divorce” doctrine, which recognizes that
issues other than the dissolution of the marriage are severed from the
divorce action when the court does not have personal jurisdiction over
50
51
the other spouse. Estin v. Estin is illustrative of the application of the
“divisible divorce” doctrine. The Court held that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause did not require New York to enforce a Nevada divorce
decree that failed to provide maintenance for a New York wife who had
52
obtained support under a prior New York decree. The Court stated that
while Nevada law permitted the marriage to be dissolved because of the
petitioner’s connection with the forum, property rights and personal
obligations could not be adjudicated unless the forum court had personal
53
jurisdiction over the respondent spouse.
Under the “divisible divorce doctrine,” issues other than the
dissolution of the marriage are severed from the divorce and the
judgment does not resolve issues other than the marital status of the
54
parties. This doctrine is recognized by the Restatement of Conflict of
55
Laws and has been accepted and applied by Minnesota’s appellate
56
courts.
50. Conlon by Conlon v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 788, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
52. Id. at 549.
53. Id.
54. Conlon, 719 F.2d at 795-96. See also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416,
418-19 (1957) (where wife not subject to Nevada jurisdiction, Nevada court could not
extinguish right to support in another state even though not reduced to judgment in the
other state); Estin, 334 U.S. at 549 (holding that a Nevada court lacking personal
jurisdiction over wife could not terminate the husband’s preexisting obligation for
support ordered in another state).
55. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws recognizes that an adjudication of status
does not require personal jurisdiction. It provides the following illustration: Assume that
“A leaves his home in State X and goes to State Y, where he becomes domiciled and
there obtains an ex parte divorce from B, his wife. Assuming that the requirements of
proper notice and of opportunity to be heard have been met, this divorce is valid and must
be recognized in X under full faith and credit even though B was not personally subject to
the jurisdiction of the Y court and at all times retained her domicile in X.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1971).
56. See Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 368, 24 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1946) (there
was a complete severance of the marriage status, but no property rights were there
determined, nor was there any provision for alimony); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn.
24, 27, 4 N.W.2d 785, 787 (1942) (citing Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 567
(1906)) (reciting established law that personal judgments rendered against non-residents
without acquiring personal jurisdiction may not be enforced in another state by virtue of
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution); Rose v. Rose, 132 Minn. 340, 343,
156 N.W. 664, 666 (1916) (upholding dissolution of the marriage “without regard to the
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VIII. CONTINUING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Once a court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the
parties to a divorce, does it ever lose that power? The question usually
arises when one of the parties to a divorce moves away and establishes a
57
domicile outside Minnesota. A majority of jurisdictions have taken the
view that they possess continuing jurisdiction. Consequently, obligors
who move from a jurisdiction where a judgment was properly entered,
and remain away for several years, are usually unable to block
modification or enforcement efforts on the ground that the forum court
lost personal jurisdiction once they moved out-of-state. Minnesota
follows the majority rule.
58
For example, in Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, the court held that even
though the husband had not resided in Minnesota for twenty-two years
and the parties’ children had reached majority, the court in which the
divorce was granted under a stipulated judgment had continuing
jurisdiction to modify or enforce the decree. Observed Justice Simonett:
Respondent argues that enforcement of a divorce judgment is a
new and independent action, requiring independent
jurisdictional contacts. He cites a North Dakota case for this
proposition, Zent v. Zent, 281 N.W.2d 41 (N.D.1979). But we
held to the contrary in Atwood v. Atwood, 253 Minn. 185, 91
N.W.2d 728 (1958), and see no reason to overrule that decision
now. In Atwood, we said: (A)n application for modification or
enforcement of provisions of a divorce decree respecting
divorce and custody of minor children is a supplementary
proceeding, incidental to the original suit; it is not an
independent proceeding or the commencement of a new action.
The jurisdiction to order such modifications is a continuing
one. 253 Minn. at 193, 91 N.W.2d at 734. Though Atwood
and cases following, Cummiskey v. Cummiskey, 259 Minn.
427, 107 N.W.2d 864 (1961), and Zaine v. Zaine, 265 Minn.
105, 120 N.W.2d 324 (1963), dealt with minor-age children,
this is not to suggest that continuing jurisdiction is cut off
when, as here, the children have reached the age of majority. A
place of the marriage, or to that of the commission of the offense for which the divorce is
granted”); Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279, 285, 59 N.W. 1017, 1018 (1894) (stating
that the court changed only the marriage status without affecting any property).
57. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act all, of course,
provide specific answers to this question. See supra notes 5-6, 8.
58. 308 N.W.2d 817 (Minn. 1981).
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divorce decree, by its nature, sets up continuing obligations; an
effort to collect arrearages should not be barred jurisdictionally
simply because the children are of age. The fact that future
support payments are no longer required by the decree makes
59
the obligation to pay the past-due support no less continuing.
There are no strong public policy reasons to suggest that Minnesota
abandon its present view of continuing jurisdiction. Furthermore, the
question of exercising continuing jurisdiction in custody cases is now
more fully addressed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
60
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
61
Continuing jurisdiction in child support matters is
Act (PKPA).
62
addressed in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.
IX. “STATUS THEORY” AND JURISDICTION
Jurisdictions are increasingly using “status” as a theory upon which
to adjudicate family law issues where personal jurisdiction cannot be
obtained over an out-of-state defendant. Expansive use of “status”
places that theory into an apparent conflict with the Due Process Clause
of the United States Constitution.
It is a black letter principle of law that the Constitution “trumps” a
state statute, and the legal question is whether application of the “status
theory” runs afoul of the Constitution. The Constitutional due process
63
issue arises initially from the Court’s decision in May v. Anderson.
There the father had obtained an ex parte Wisconsin divorce, which
granted custody of the minor children to him. He attempted to enforce
the custody decree in Ohio, where the mother was now living, after she
refused to return them to Wisconsin while exercising visitation. The
Court held that Ohio did not have to recognize the Wisconsin decree
because it was entered without personal jurisdiction over the mother. Of
possible significance is the fact that the parties had stipulated in the
divorce action that the children were domiciled in Wisconsin.
Since the Court’s ruling, it has been subjected to considerable
64
debate and criticism.
Its critics have lauded Justice Jackson’s
59. Id. at 818.
60. MINN. STAT. §§ 518D.101-317 (2002).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
62. MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.101-902 (2002).
63. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
64. See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child
Custody and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 229 (1979);
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative
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dissenting opinion in which he stated in part:
Custody is viewed not with the idea of adjudicating rights in
the children, as if they were chattels, but rather with the idea of
making the best disposition possible for the welfare of the
children. To speak of a court’s “cutting off” a mother’s right
to custody of her children, as if it raised problems similar to
those involved in “cutting off” her rights in a plot of ground, is
to obliterate these obvious distinctions. Personal jurisdiction of
all parties to be affected by a proceeding is highly desirable, to
make certain that they have had valid notice and opportunity to
be heard. But the assumption that it overrides all other
considerations and in its absence a state is constitutionally
impotent to resolve questions of custody flies in the face of our
65
own cases.
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, noted that although
Ohio was not required to give full faith and credit to the Wisconsin order,
the due process clause did not prohibit Ohio from recognizing it “as a
66
matter of local law” or comity. The Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws accepts the Frankfurter interpretation of May v. Anderson as
67
authoritative.
While there is authority to the contrary, a majority of courts
considering this question appear to have rejected the plurality opinion in
May v. Anderson and have accepted the status exception when
considering child custody issues where personal jurisdiction cannot be
obtained over one of the parties. The state courts considering the issue
have held that the state having the most significant connections with the
child and his family will be permitted to make a custody adjudication in
the absence of personal jurisdiction over a parent who does not reside in
68
the forum state.
Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1232-33
(1969).
65. May v Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 535-36 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 cmt. c.
68. See McArthur v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 298 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (ruling that significant connection jurisdiction continues in the rendering state until
the child and all parties have moved away); In re Marriage of Leonard, 175 Cal. Rptr.
903, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state
parent is not required to make a binding custody determination); Burton v. Bishop, 269
S.E.2d 417, 417-18 (Ga. 1980) (holding that under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Georgia courts must recognize an Ohio custody decree despite
the absence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent); Yearta v. Scroggins, 268
S.E.2d 151, 153 (Ga. 1980) (noting that the public policy of the state is to recognize child
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Tennessee rejected May v. Anderson on the ground that subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have “abolished the distinctions between in
rem and in personam” jurisdiction, and “recognized that exceptions can
be made to the ‘minimum contacts’ standard” in “status” cases, such as
69
child custody decisions.
The court declared that a state “having the
most significant connections with the child and his family will be
permitted to make a custody adjudication even in the absence of personal
70
jurisdiction over a parent who does not reside in the forum state.”
A Texas court, taking essentially the same view as Tennessee,
explained that:
[U]nlike adjudications of child support and visitation expense,
custody determinations are status adjudications not dependent
upon personal jurisdiction over the parents. Generally, a
family relationship is among those matters in which the forum
state has such a strong interest that its courts may reasonably
make an adjudication affecting that relationship even though
one of the parties to the relationship may have had no personal
71
contacts with the forum state.
The status exception has been extended in some jurisdictions to
custody decrees where there is no personal jurisdiction under principles of comity); In re
Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 117-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that
custody is an adjudication of a child’s status, which means that a court may adjudicate the
matter without acquiring personal jurisdiction); Genoe v. Genoe, 500 A.2d 3, 8 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (noting that the status of a child may be decided quasi in rem
pursuant to the UCCJA and, therefore, custody and visitation orders can be made without
regard to either parent’s personal jurisdiction); Hart v. Hart, 327 S.E.2d 631, 635-37
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (finding a legitimate basis for determining custody based on the
significant connection between the children and the state and noting that personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident parent is not a UCCJA requirement); In re Matter of
O’Connor, 690 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a court may determine a
custody dispute against a nonresident spouse over whom it cannot exercise personal
jurisdiction); McAtee v. McAtee, 323 S.E.2d 611, 616-17 (W. Va. 1984) (noting that the
status exception permits the court to adjudicate custody without obtaining personal
jurisdiction over both parents).
69. Fernandez v. Fernandez, No. 85-194-II, 1986 WL 7935, at *1-*2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 15, 1986). See also Brown v. Brown, 847 S.W.2d 496, 499 n.2 (Tenn. 1993)
(noting that the Supreme Court decision in May v. Anderson has largely been ignored and
that neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA requires personal jurisdiction over the respondent).
70. Fernandez, 1986 WL 7935, at *2 (citation omitted). See also Roderick v.
Roderick, 776 S.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that the UCCJA
permits the courts of the state with the most significant contacts to make custody
determinations even without personal jurisdiction over the nonresident parent).
71. In re Interest of S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992) (citations omitted). See
In re Marriage of Los, 593 N.E.2d 126, 129-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (choosing to follow
the established precedent that status determinations do not require personal jurisdiction
over the parents).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/9

18

Oliphant: Essay: Jurisdiction in Family Law Matters: The Minnesota Perspect
9 OLIPHANT - PAGINATED.DOC

1/13/2004 4:26 PM

2003] MINNESOTA JURISDICTION IN FAMILY LAW MATTERS

575
72

other family law areas including parental termination proceedings. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the status rationale when deciding a
73
nonconsensual stepparent adoption dispute in In re Adoption of J.L.H.
There, the children’s natural father and stepmother petitioned the court
for the nonconsensual adoption of the father’s children by the stepmother
on the ground that their mother, a nonresident of Oklahoma, willfully
failed to pay child support. Finally, the theory has been applied by a
majority of the Iowa Supreme Court to sustain the issuance of a
protective order without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over a
74
defendant.
Minnesota has applied the status rationale in interstate custody
disputes, which is consistent with a majority of jurisdictions that have
75
recently examined the issue. For example, in Willmore v. Willmore,
the court held that in the absence of a conflicting court order from
another jurisdiction, a wife, who was a Minnesota resident and who
established domicile of her two children in Minnesota, could invoke the
jurisdiction of Minnesota courts to determine custody of the children
who were forcibly removed from the state by her estranged husband.
The court said it possessed this power despite the fact that the exhusband was a nonresident, the wife had been unable to secure personal
service upon him, and she did not know the precise address of the
husband and children who were not in the jurisdiction.
It is interesting to note that in an older decision, State ex rel. Larson
76
v. Larson, the court concluded that proceedings to determine the
custody of a minor child are in the nature of an action in rem, with the
res being the status of the minor. It stated that only the court of the state
72. See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. JS-734, 543 P.2d
454, 459-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that the state acting in its parens patriae
capacity is justified in providing for effective termination proceedings, even in the
absence of in personam jurisdiction over a non-consenting parent); In re Interest of
M.L.K., 768 P.2d 316, 319-20 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (determining that termination of
parental rights is analogous to the termination of a marriage relationship and, therefore, is
within the “status exception” to the minimum contacts rule); Wenz v. Schwartze, 598
P.2d 1086, 1092 (Mont. 1979) (concluding personal jurisdiction over a parent is not
necessary in order to terminate parental rights, without specifically discussing status
exception); In re Adoption of Copeland, 43 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(relying on the status exception in parental rights termination proceeding against a father
in prison); In re Interest of A.E.H., 468 N.W.2d 190, 198-200 (Wis. 1991) (focusing on
child’s contacts with the state in order to terminate parental rights).
73. 737 P.2d 915 (Okla. 1987).
74. Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Iowa 2001).
75. 273 Minn. 537, 143 N.W.2d 630 (1966).
76. 190 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934).
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where the minor is domiciled possesses the power to fix or change that
status.
77
In Johnson v. Murray, a recent unpublished decision, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in dictum, discussed the status principle
and its application to a custody dispute. It observed:
Although we hold that the district court has personal
jurisdiction over respondent, we note that under the Act,
personal jurisdiction over a contestant outside the state may not
be required for a court to determine the custody status of a
child. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bueche, 550 N.E.2d 48, 51
(Ill. App. 1990) (stating that personal jurisdiction over either
parent is unnecessary for district court to issue custody order
under UCCJA as long as jurisdictional requirements of Act are
met); In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d 107, 118 (Ind.
App. 1982) (stating that “in personam jurisdiction is not
required under the Uniform Act”) (citations omitted). Because
a custody determination is, in effect, an adjudication of the
child’s status, courts have adjudicated custody under the Act
without acquiring personal jurisdiction over absent contestants.
In re Marriage of Hudson, 434 N.E.2d at 117. The Act
requires, however, that contestants outside this state be given
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard in the custody
proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 518A.04 (1998); Minn. Stat. §
78
518A.05, subd. 1 (1998).
When the Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed Johnson v.
79
Murray, it did not consider the question of personal jurisdiction.
Rather, it focused exclusively on the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act and its application to the facts of the dispute.
In conclusion, it appears that Minnesota has cautiously adopted the
status theory in the area of custody disputes and, in doing so, has aligned
itself with a majority of the courts in the nation on that issue. It has not,
however, squarely discussed the potential implications of May v.
Anderson—which would be informative and useful.
X. PERSONAL JURISDICTION—TRADITIONAL VIEW
Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, which can never be waived,
personal jurisdiction may be granted by the consent of the parties or
77. No. CX-99-2173, 2000 WL 1146338 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2000), rev’d in
part, 648 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 2002).
78. Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted).
79. 648 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 2002).
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80

waived through inaction. The distinction between subject matter and
personal jurisdiction rests on the characterization of personal jurisdiction
as a matter of individual liberty rather than as a statutorily defined
81
limitation on a court’s power. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that:
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows
not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The
personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty . . . . Because the requirement of personal
jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like
82
other such rights, be waived.
Service within the forum. A long-standing principle is that a person
becomes subject to personal jurisdiction when served with legal process
while within the forum state. This applies even if the person served is an
83
out-of-state resident who is only briefly within the forum state.
The traditional view of personal jurisdiction and service within the
84
forum was discussed extensively in Burnham v. Superior Court.
In
that case, the wife brought a divorce action in California and served her
husband with divorce papers when he visited their children in that state.
The Court ruled that his physical presence within the state conferred
personal jurisdiction over him—no additional “minimum contacts” were
required.
Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality of four, declared that
“jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that
define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and
85
substantial justice.’ ” Three other justices concurred in an opinion filed
by Justice Brennan. In their view, tradition alone was not dispositive;
they would judge the constitutionality of in-state service on a nonresident
86
by examining contemporary notions of due process.
However, the
80. See Huhn v. Foley Bros., 221 Minn. 279, 286, 22 N.W.2d 3, 8 (1946).
81. N. Cent. Servs., Inc. v. E. Communications, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
82. Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982)
(footnote omitted). The Minnesota Court of Appeals has referenced this case. N. Cent.
Servs., Inc., 379 N.W.2d at 710.
83. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 628-32 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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justices ultimately concluded, “as a rule the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based on his voluntary presence in the
87
forum will satisfy the requirements of due process.”
They reasoned
that by visiting the forum state, a defendant avails himself of significant
88
benefits, such as the protection of his health and safety. Justice Stevens
joined neither Justice Scalia’s nor Justice Brennan’s opinion, but
concurred in the judgment based on considerations of history, fairness
and common sense.
Minnesota’s application of personal service within its borders is
consistent with the views expressed in Burnham. For example, in In re
89
Marriage of Calhoun v. Rookstool, the ex-husband came to Minnesota
to pick up his child for visitation and was personally served with his ex90
wife’s motion to modify child support. When challenging the exercise
of personal jurisdiction, he attempted to distinguish Burnham on the
ground that it applied only to service of a summons and complaint or
91
petition and not to parties served with motion papers. In rejecting his
claim, the court viewed Burnham as supporting the establishment of
92
personal jurisdiction over him.
There are no apparent strong public
policy reasons for changing Minnesota’s view in this area.
XI. WAIVING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
General rule. As a general rule, a Minnesota district court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the individual submits
to jurisdiction by consenting; entering a general appearance; or by filing
a responsive document, which effectively waives any contest to personal
jurisdiction. The defense of personal jurisdiction is also deemed waived
if not raised as a defense, made by motion, or included in a responsive
93
pleading.
87. Id. at 639.
88. See id. at 640.
89. 1995 WL 265047 (Minn. Ct. App. May 9, 1995).
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(a) (1)-(2). See also Majestic Inc. v. Berry, 593
N.W.2d 251, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). In addition, Rule 12.08 does not “preclude
waiver by implication.” Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn.
2000) (citation omitted). “[D]efendant waives the defense of insufficient service of
process, even though asserted by answer, by affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of the
district court to obtain partial summary judgment without earlier or simultaneously
moving to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of process.” Id. at 864 (footnote
omitted). It has long been the rule “that a party may, by consent, give jurisdiction over
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Counterclaim. The general rule applied to counterclaims is that
when a party asserts a counterclaim, the party making the assertion
automatically waives any claim that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.
The waiver theory rests on the view that when the counterclaim is
asserted, the party voluntarily invokes the power of the court on the
party’s own behalf. Therefore, the party’s conduct provides the court
with jurisdiction. Courts also reason that it would be unsatisfactory to
allow a defendant to challenge personal jurisdiction while seeking
recovery on a counterclaim. Moreover, it is thought unfair for a
defendant to bind the adverse party to a result without being bound if the
94
result proved unsatisfactory.
To a limited extent, this rule of waiver
95
has been modified by Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02.
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure declare that “[n]o defense . . . is
waived by being joined with one or more defenses in a responsive
96
pleading or motion.” The Rules also declare that “[a] party may also
state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of
97
Because of this language, the mere assertion of a
consistency.”
counterclaim should no longer automatically result in a personal
jurisdictional waiver. However, the responding party must act quickly to
preserve a personal jurisdiction challenge after asserting a
98
counterclaim.
Failure to promptly challenge personal jurisdiction after asserting a
counterclaim may result in a finding that the party has waived the
his person, and it follows as a consequence that, where there is any defect of jurisdiction,
or it has ceased, he may waive the objection, and does so when he takes or consents to
any step in the cause which assumes that jurisdiction exists or continues.” Quaker
Creamery Co. v. Carlson, 124 Minn. 147, 150, 144 N.W. 449, 449 (1913). “A party who
takes or consents to any step in a proceeding which assumes that jurisdiction exists or
continues has made a general appearance which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the
court.” Slayton Gun Club v. Town of Shetek, 286 Minn. 461, 467, 176 N.W.2d 544, 548
(1970) (citation omitted).
94. Federal-Hoffman, Inc. v. Fackler, 549 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
See Morehart v. Furley, 149 Minn. 56, 57, 182 N.W. 723, 724 (1921). See also Peterson
v. Eishen, 512 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Minn. 1994) (“[A] defendant submits to the jurisdiction
of the court” by taking “some affirmative step invoking the power of the court or
implicitly recognizing its jurisdiction.”); Ceminsky v. Mardell, 385 N.W.2d 888, 891
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (making a counterclaim and third-party complaint results in
waiver of personal jurisdiction defense).
95. See Federal-Hoffman, Inc., 549 N.W.2d at 95.
96. MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02. The rule mandates that counterclaims be asserted in any
required responsive pleading.
97. MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.05(b).
98. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(a) (covering preservation of certain defenses,
including lack of personal jurisdiction).
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imperfection. A party who fails to act quickly may be viewed as
demonstrating a willingness to “invoke[] the power of the court in his
99
own behalf.”
As a consequence of the party’s inaction, he or she is
viewed as waiving the jurisdictional defense and having forfeited the
100
flexibility of modern pleading recognized by the court.
101
Crossclaims. In Johnson Bros. Corp. v. Arrowhead Co.,
the
court applied the above analysis to crossclaims and concluded that the
mere assertion of a crossclaim “does not [automatically] waive a
102
properly raised jurisdictional defense.”
Discovery. A party who properly challenges the court’s jurisdiction
does not waive that defense by subsequent participation in the discovery
103
process.
Custody Modification Actions.
Under certain conditions, a
nonresident who brings a child custody modification motion in
Minnesota is not subject to a court’s power to hear other actions such as
104
child support. For example, in Ferguson v. Ferguson the court held
that the ex-husband did not consent to Minnesota’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him despite his efforts to seek assistance from its courts
105
on several separate occasions.
The dispute involved a court battle between a financially destitute
mother, who had custody of the couple’s two children, and her exhusband, a well-to-do Montana physician. The mother left Montana for
Minnesota several years earlier in violation of a Montana court order.
After she left Montana, her ex-husband successfully brought two changeof-custody motions and obtained an ex parte motion regarding visitation
in Minnesota. He also appeared at a hearing in Minnesota where he
successfully defended the ex parte action. Both the trial judge and the
Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s argument that by his
behavior he had consented to Minnesota’s exercise of jurisdiction over
him. The court of appeals observed:
Ferguson’s principal contention appears to be that J. Paul
Ferguson consented to personal jurisdiction of the Minnesota
99. See Morehart, 149 Minn. at 57, 182 N.W. at 724 (citations omitted).
100. Federal-Hoffman, Inc., 549 N.W.2d at 95-96.
101. 459 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
102. Id. at 163.
103. See Anderson v. Mikel Drilling Co., 257 Minn. 487, 495-96, 102 N.W.2d 293,
300 (1960); Wilkie v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
104. 411 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
105. Id. at 239-41.
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courts by bringing motions involving custody and visitation
matters. We recognize that the requirement of personal
jurisdiction is an individual right which can be waived.
However, J. Paul Ferguson did not choose to avail himself of
the Minnesota courts; he was forced to do so by the fact that Ila
Ferguson had moved to Minnesota with the children in
violation of a court order, which resulted in Minnesota gaining
custody jurisdiction as the “home state” of the children.
Accordingly, he had no choice but to appear in the Minnesota
courts to enforce his visitation rights. See Minn. Stat. §
518A.02(b) (1986) (custody matters include visitation
106
rights).
As a practical matter, the issue of modifying custody is now
controlled by the UCCJEA and the PKPA. Whether Minnesota will
reject finding jurisdiction in future cases because of parental misconduct
is problematic.
XII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: SPOUSE’S RESIDENCE
Minnesota courts have held in several older decisions that a wife’s
107
The court viewed a husband “as
domicile is that of her husband’s.
head of the family, [therefore] it is for the husband to determine and fix
108
the domicile of the family, including that of the wife . . . .”
A wife
could establish a separate domicile only if her husband failed to establish
109
one for her.
However, this outmoded view is no longer recognized.
110
For example, in Tureson v. Tureson, the court recognized that for
the purpose of creating a jurisdictional basis for divorce, a wife may
establish and maintain a residence or domicile separate from that of her
111
112
husband during the marriage.
Jones v. Jones ended any speculation
about this point.
XIII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: CHILD’S DOMICILE
Because children are legally incapable of forming the intent
106. Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
107. See, e.g., State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 190 Minn. 489, 491, 252 N.W. 329, 330
(1934) (citations omitted).
108. Kramer v. Lamb, 84 Minn. 468, 471, 87 N.W. 1024, 1025-26 (1901) (citing
Williams v. Moody, 35 Minn. 280, 28 N.W. 510 (1886)).
109. See Gussman v. Rogers, 190 Minn. 153, 157, 251 N.W. 18, 19 (1933).
110. 281 Minn. 107, 160 N.W.2d 552 (1968).
111. See id.
112. 402 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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necessary to establish a domicile, they take the same domicile as their
113
If a child is born out-of-wedlock, the child takes the domicile
parents.
114
of his or her mother.
XIV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: PRETRIAL BURDEN
When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction at the pretrial
stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of
minimum contacts through its complaint and supporting evidence,
115
“which will be taken as true.”
In questionable cases, doubt is resolved
116
An order denying a pretrial motion
in favor of retaining jurisdiction.
for dismissal based upon a lack of personal jurisdiction is “appealable as
117
a matter of right.”
XV. CONFLICT OF LAW
When a couple marries in one state, but divorce in Minnesota,
118
Minnesota law normally applies.
XVI. SPECIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS PROVISIONS
In order to increase the possibility of gaining jurisdiction over a
party who is within the state but difficult to serve, the legislature
promulgated Minnesota Statutes section 543.20, which states that:
[I]n addition to the methods of service of process provided in
the rules of civil procedure, service of a summons, an order to
show cause, or an order or judgment within this state may also
be made upon an individual by delivering a copy to the
individual personally at the individual’s place of employment
or at a post-secondary education institution in which the
individual is enrolled. The employer shall make the individual
available for the purpose of delivering a copy. The postsecondary education institution must make the individual’s
class schedule available to the process server or make the
113. See In re Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 421, 18 N.W.2d 147, 151-52 (1945).
114. Id.
115. See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1978) (citing
Hardrives, Inc. v. City of LaCrosse, Wis., 307 Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816
(1976) (citing Wuertz v. Garvey, 287 Minn. 353, 178 N.W.2d 630 (1970)).
116. Hardrives, 307 Minn. at 296, 240 N.W.2d at 818.
117. Wheeler v. Teufel, 443 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (citing In re
State & Regents Bldg. Asbestos Cases, 435 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Minn. 1989).
118. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 756 n.1 (Minn. 1981).
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individual available for the purpose of delivering a copy. No
employer or post-secondary education institution shall deny a
process server admittance to the employer’s or post-secondary
education institution’s premises for the purpose of making
119
service under this section.
Service of process must be made personally on the individual. The
statute applies to an action for dissolution, annulment, legal separation,
or a proceeding under the Parentage Act. It can be used in actions under
both Minnesota Statutes section 256.87 and the Uniform Interstate
120
Family Support Act (UIFSA) and for contempt of court for failure to
pay child support. Other uses include service of petitions under the
Domestic Abuse Act and motions, orders and judgments for the payment
121
of child support, should a court order personal service of them.
An employer may not discharge or otherwise discipline an
employee, nor shall a post-secondary education institution dismiss or
122
discipline a student as a result of service under this section.
XVII. LONG-ARM STATUTE—GENERAL
When a court considers exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident,
two requirements must be met. First, the language placed by the
123
legislature in a long-arm statute must be satisfied.
Second, “minimum
119. MINN. STAT. § 543.20, subd. 1 (2002).
120. MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.101-.902 (2002).
121. MINN. STAT. § 543.20, subd. 2 (2002).
122. § 543.20, subd. 1.
123. See generally MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (2002), which reads:
543.19. Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
Subdivision 1. As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in
this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any foreign corporation or any
nonresident individual, or the individual’s personal representative, in the
same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a
resident of this state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent,
the foreign corporation or nonresident individual: (a) Owns, uses, or
possesses any real or personal property situated in this state, or (b) Transacts
any business within the state, or (c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing
injury or property damage, or (d) Commits any act outside Minnesota
causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following
exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found: (1) Minnesota has no
substantial interest in providing a forum; or (2) the burden placed on the
defendant by being brought under the state’s jurisdiction would violate
fairness and substantial justice; or (3) the cause of action lies in defamation
or privacy. Subd. 2. The service of process on any person who is subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be
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contacts” must exist between the defendant and Minnesota in order to
124
satisfy due process —that is, there must be sufficient contacts between
the defendant and Minnesota to satisfy “traditional notions of fair play
125
and substantial justice.”
The advent and growth of long-arm statutes represents an attempt
by Minnesota to provide a litigation forum for the convenience of its own
citizens at the expense of citizens of other states. The statutes are an
outgrowth of a mobile, industrialized society that has reduced the time
and difficulty once associated with travel from Minnesota to other states
in the United States.
The language used by legislatures when drafting long-arm statutes
varies from state to state, and when initially encountered it may appear
126
that the legislature has ignored domestic matters.
However, state
courts have found creative ways to construe the statutes to encompass
domestic disputes. They have seized upon phrases such as “transacting
business” or “tortious conduct,” and found them applicable to domestic
127
disputes. For example, in Prybolsky v. Prybolsky, a Delaware family
court held that it had acquired jurisdiction under that state’s long-arm
statute over a nonresident husband involved in a domestic dispute by
128
means of the “doing business” language in its long-arm statute.
It
reasoned that marriage is a contract and that support and other rights
129
springing from that contract have financial and business implications.
Therefore, the phrase “doing business” encompassed a marital
made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this
state with the same effect as though the summons had been personally served
within this state. Subd. 3. Only causes of action arising from acts
enumerated in subdivision 1 may be asserted against a defendant in an action
in which jurisdiction over the defendant is based upon this section. Subd. 4.
Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any
process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law or the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Subd. 5. Nonresident individual, as
used in this section, means any individual, or the individual’s personal
representative, who is not domiciled or residing in the state when suit is
commenced.
For child support actions involving out-of-state defendants, see MINN. STAT. § 518C
(2002).
124. Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. 1985) (citing Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
125. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
126. See, e.g., supra note 123, which sets out Minnesota’s general long-arm statute.
127. 430 A.2d 804 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1981); superseded by statute as stated in T.L. v.
W.L., 820 A.2d 506, 508-09 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003).
128. Id. at 807.
129. Id.
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130

relationship.
The phrase “tortious act,” which is common in long-arm statutes,
has been applied in several jurisdictions to encompass domestic
131
matters.
Minnesota has determined that civil proceedings to establish
paternity involve “ ‘tortious conduct’ within the meaning of the long-arm
132
statute,”
and has given a broad application to this phrase. For
133
example, in Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole, the court held that the longarm statute involved “tortious conduct” and reached a nonresident father
because of the effects of physical and emotional abuse occurring in
134
Minnesota despite the fact the alleged abuse occurred in Pennsylvania.
There are some indications from opinions involving Minnesota’s
long-arm statute that whether a court will consider applying it to a
particular situation may depend on the court’s focus; for example,
whether it concentrates on the injury to the victim or the conduct of the
135
parents. For example, in Ferguson v. Ferguson, discussed earlier in
this article, the court was unable to find a tort having been committed
within Minnesota where the ex-wife brought a child support modification
action in the state. The court rested its decision primarily on the conduct
of the custodial mother who had fled Montana in violation of a court
order years earlier—it did not focus on the damage suffered to the child
as a result of a lack of child support.
136
In a subsequent decision, Impola v. Impola, the court suggested
that damages for the purposes of long-arm jurisdiction suffered by a
child because of non-support turned on whether the child was born in
Minnesota. The court stated:
Although paternity has been denominated a tort within the
130. Id.
131. See Poindexter v. Willis, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967). Accord In re
Marriage of Highsmith, 488 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ill. 1986) (citations omitted); Black v.
Rasile, 318 N.W.2d 475, 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298
Minn. 438, 441-42, 216 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1974) (citing Baxter v. Coughlin, 70 Minn. 1,
72 N.W. 797 (1897)); In re Custody of Miller, 548 P.2d 542, 546 (Wash. 1976). See also
Leonard G. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 MICH. L. REV. 795, 839
(1964).
132. Ulmer v. O’Malley, 307 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Minn.1981). See also Nelson, 298
Minn. at 442, 216 N.W.2d at 143.
133. 572 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
134. See id.at 750. See also Howells v. McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Minn.
1979) (holding the failure of a father who resides in Wisconsin to pay child support to his
child in Minnesota is tortious conduct, subjecting him to personal jurisdiction in
Minnesota).
135. 411 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
136. 464 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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scope of the long-arm statute, we have drawn a distinction
between paternity actions and actions for dissolution or for
modification of child support which do not involve a
complainant’s injury within the State of Minnesota. In
Mahoney, this court held that statutory authority under the
long-arm statute did not extend to reach a nonresident
respondent in a dissolution action such that the trial court had
jurisdiction to render judgment with respect to spousal
maintenance, property settlement or attorney fees. Similarly,
in Ferguson v. Ferguson, we held the long-arm statute did not
provide statutory authority to reach a nonresident parent to
modify a child support order.
However, we believe the facts of the instant action compel the
trial court to assume jurisdiction. In neither Mahoney nor
Ferguson did the complainant sufficiently establish her injury
within the state to support the trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. In contrast, the conduct giving rise to MI’s birth
and appellant’s injury took place while respondent was a
resident of Minnesota and occurred at all times within the
state. Of critical importance is that the conception took place
in Minnesota, that respondent acknowledged paternity within
the state, and that respondent was a resident when the child
was conceived, during the pregnancy, and at times
137
thereafter.
However, the injury to a child in terms of non-support is the same
whether it is born inside or outside of Minnesota—the key issue is
whether the child resides in Minnesota. The distinction made by the
court appears unwarranted.
138
In H.A.W. v. Manuel, the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused on
the injury. There, Minnesota children were allegedly assaulted by a
participant in a cultural exchange program outside of the state and the
139
children sought recovery within the state.
The court observed that the
injury to the Minnesota children and the consent signed by a defendant
140
met the requirements of Minnesota’s long-arm statute, and stated:
Minnesota’s statutes include a “long arm” statute which
authorizes jurisdiction over any nonresident who “[c]ommits
any act outside of Minnesota causing injury or property
damage in Minnesota,” subject to several exceptions. Minn.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 298-99 (full citations omitted).
524 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 11-12.
See id. at 12.
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Stat. § 543.19, subd. 1(d) (1992) . . . .
In this instance, if we assume the facts alleged by respondents,
the long-arm statute applies. According to these facts, appellant
committed an act outside of Minnesota; he signed consent
forms which allowed his son to visit here. This fulfills the first
half of section 543.19, subd. 1(d). In addition, appellant’s act
allegedly caused injuries to respondents’ children in
Minnesota; if appellant had not signed the forms, his son could
not have abused respondents’ children. This appears to satisfy
the second half of section 543.19, subd. 1(d). Thus, based on
the given facts, respondents’ claim passes the first test and we
141
apply the constitutional analysis.
Paternity actions raise troubling issues regarding application of the
language in Minnesota’s general long-arm statute. Minnesota has held
that failure to provide child support is sufficient to constitute a “tortious
142
It rejected the thesis
act” within the meaning of its long-arm statute.
that jurisdiction in paternity proceedings was not contemplated by the
long-arm statute because no such cause of action was recognized as a tort
at common law and because no “injury or property damage” is
143
involved.
Several jurisdictions that have examined this issue disagree with
144
Minnesota.
They accept the argument that no tortious conduct may
occur until the alleged tortfeasor has been established as the child’s
father and then assigned a duty of support. They reason that until the
duty of support is established, no tort can be committed; therefore, “[t]o
saddle a defendant with the burden of child support before paternity has
145
been established would be both illogical and unjust.”
Furthermore, a
141. Id. at 12.
142. State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d 140 (1974).
143. Id. at 440, 216 N.W.2d at 142.
144. See, e.g., Lightell v. Lightell, 394 S.2d 41, 42-43 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)
(requiring jurisdiction even after finding paternity); A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 507 P.2d 468, 469
(Colo. 1973); Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. ex rel. Luke v. Wright, 522 So. 2d
838, 840 (Fla. 1988); Boyer v. Boyer, 383 N.E.2d 223, 226-27 (Ill. 1978); Duncan v.
Duncan, 419 N.E.2d 700, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); State ex rel. Carrington v. Schutts, 535
P.2d 982, 984 (Kan. 1975); State ex rel. Larimore v. Snyder, 291 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Neb.
1980); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 428 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980). See
also Davis v. Davis, 452 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.C. Pa. 1978) (holding that a long-arm statute
providing jurisdiction over a nonresident whose out-of-state action [not omission] causes
harm within the state requires affirmative misconduct and not mere nonfeasance, and
does not apply to actions to enforce a foreign separation agreement for overdue support
payments).
145. Luke, 522 So. 2d at 840.
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court may not, as an initial matter, assume a defendant is the father of a
child so that the matter of nonsupport can be adjudicated, and upon
finding nonsupport, convert a failure to pay child support into “tortious
146
conduct which then justifies adjudicating the matter.
In conclusion, the application of Minnesota’s long-arm statute
appears to turn on whether the court focuses squarely on the injury to a
child or the conduct of a parent. This distinction should be reexamined
in light of a strong public policy to protect children, which would always
focus on the damage to the child. Whether the long-arm statute should
continue to apply to paternity actions is another intriguing question that
remains open for Minnesota courts to revisit.
XVIII. DUE PROCESS BARRIERS
TO THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Although Minnesota’s general long-arm statute has been construed
as applicable to domestic disputes, the United States Constitution may
nevertheless prevent its application. “The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the exercise of
jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting the rights or
147
interests of nonresident defendants.”
Although the language in a longarm statute may give a state court power to bring an out-of-state
defendant before it, the question remains whether application of the
statute exceeds the constitutional limitations imposed on the state by the
Fourteenth Amendment. A court must be satisfied that application of the
long-arm statute meets the “minimum contacts” test. In International
148
Shoe Co. v. Washington,
the following due process test was
established:
Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
149
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
In Kulko v. California, the court applied this test to an effort made
by an ex-wife located in California to increase a child support award
150
The facts briefly follow.
when her ex-husband lived in New York.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
436 U.S. at 92.
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After their separation, the ex-husband remained in New York, the
151
The
state of marital domicile, and the ex-wife moved to California.
couple executed a separation agreement in New York that provided that
the parties’ two children were to reside with Mr. Kulko in New York
during the school year and with their mother during their Christmas,
152
Easter, and summer vacations.
Mr. Kulko also agreed to pay $3000 a
153
The terms of this agreement were later
year in child support.
154
incorporated into a Haitian divorce decree obtained by Mrs. Kulko.
Subsequently, the parties’ daughter expressed a desire to live full
155
time with her mother.
Mr. Kulko acquiesced and paid the child’s
156
A few years later, the couple’s son expressed to
airfare to California.
157
his mother a desire to live with her.
Without Mr. Kulko’s knowledge,
Mrs. Kulko sent her son a plane ticket, which he used to join his mother
158
and sister in California.
With both children now residing with her in California, Mrs. Kulko
159
filed suit in that state to obtain increased child support.
Mr. Kulko
resisted on the ground that he had insufficient contacts to warrant the
160
California court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over him.
The
California Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that by
sending his daughter to reside permanently in California, he had
purposely availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of
161
that state.
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating
that the mere fact that Mr. Kulko “acquiesced” in the desire of his
daughter to live with her mother was not a sufficient contact with
California to warrant imposition of the unreasonable burden of litigating
162
a child support action there.
The Court observed that there was no
163
other activity that would bring Mr. Kulko in contact with California.
It also stated that the former wife was not without remedy, as she could
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 97-98.
See id. at 100-01.
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initiate a proceeding under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act “and have its merits adjudicated in the State of the alleged
obligor’s residence, without either party’s having to leave his or her own
164
State.”
Minnesota follows Kulko but applies a five-part test to help
determine whether due process bars application of its long-arm
165
statutes.
The first three factors of that test are of primary
166
consideration. The factors are:
(1) the quantity of the defendant’s contacts with the state;
(2) the nature and quality of the contacts;
(3) the connection of the cause of action with those contacts;
(4) the interest of the state in providing a forum; and
167
(5) convenience to the parties.
When evaluating the nature and quality of the contacts, a court must
determine whether the respondent (defendant) “purposefully availed”
168
itself of the benefits and protections of Minnesota law.
Requiring
purposeful availment ensures that a respondent (defendant) will not have
to appear in a jurisdiction solely because of “attenuated contacts” or the
169
“unilateral activity of another party or third person.
Minnesota has
said that the reach of Minnesota’s long-arm jurisdiction should not be
such that “anyone who deals with a Minnesota resident in any way . . .
170
can be brought into the Minnesota courts to respond to a suit.”
Purposeful availment may be established through the “stream-ofcommerce theory,” whereby a state asserts personal jurisdiction over a
business if that business “delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
171
in the forum state.”
However, “stream of commerce” is not limited to
164. Id. at 99.
165. Dent-Air, Inc. v. Beech Mountain Air Serv., Inc., 332 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Minn.
1983) (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965) and Vikse v.
Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276, 282 (Minn. 1982).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 907.
168. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citing Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 299 (1980)).
169. Id.
170. Wa1ker Mgmt., Inc. v. FHC Enters., Inc., 446 N.W.2d 913, 914 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902, 906 (D.
Minn. 1971)).
171. Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 1985) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98). See also Real Prop., Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 427
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commercial activity, and includes “any purposeful acts by an individual,
172
whether personal, private, or commercial.”
Minnesota’s personal jurisdiction decisions in the family law arena
following Kulko v. California appear occasionally inconsistent. For
173
example, in H.A.W. v. Manuel,
discussed earlier in relation to
174
construction of Minnesota’s long-arm statute,
the court found that
there were not sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process where
the defendant’s only contact with Minnesota was when he consented to
his son’s participation in a cultural exchange program. Observed the
court:
The facts of the current case indicate a far more attenuated
contact than that found in Kulko. Unlike Kulko, appellant has
never been in this country, let alone the forum state. In
addition, appellant consented only to a short visit by his son,
not to permanent residence. Thus, the reasoning of Kulko
applies with even greater force here. Appellant’s consent to his
son’s desire to participate in a cultural exchange does not
amount to purposeful availment of the benefits and protection
of Minnesota law and does not constitute a sufficient contact to
175
justify jurisdiction in this state.
176
In Ulmer v. O’Malley, the court refused to extend jurisdiction to
177
It held
an alleged out-of-state father of a child born out of wedlock.
that due process prevented Minnesota from exercising personal
jurisdiction because the putative father’s relationship with the child’s
mother had occurred entirely in South Dakota, the child was conceived
there, and the mother moved to Minnesota when she was approximately
178
seven months pregnant.
The putative father had neither visited nor
called the mother in Minnesota and his only contacts with Minnesota
consisted of his attorney’s responses to adoption agency’s requests for
179
cooperation.
In another Minnesota decision, Sherburne County ex rel. Pouliet v.

N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1988).
172. Ross v. Ross, 358 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Mass. 1976) (citing Van Wagenberg v. Van
Wagenberg, 215 A.2d 812 (Md. 1966)).
173. 524 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
174. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
175. Manuel, 524 N.W.2d at 14.
176. 307 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1981).
177. Id. at 777-78. The relationship developed in South Dakota. Id. at 777.
178. Id. at 777.
179. Id.
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180

Kennedy, the alleged father, a Montana resident, engaged in a single
act of consensual intercourse with the mother, a Minnesota citizen,
181
during a visit to Minnesota.
Following the birth of a child in
Minnesota, an action was begun here against the alleged father to
determine responsibility for medical expenses related to the birth and to
182
establish child support.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
while the long-arm statute applied, neither the nature nor the quality of
183
the contact satisfied due process.
184
In Brown County Family Service Center v. Miner,
the alleged
father of a child born to a woman in Minnesota had never physically
185
However, he sent letters to a Minnesota address
been within the state.
186
and also made a few telephone calls to Minnesota.
The Court of
Appeals held that these contacts were not sufficient to give Minnesota
personal jurisdiction over him as they failed to satisfy the minimum
187
contacts tests.
The court noted that the father could not have
anticipated being required to defend a paternity action in Minnesota
based on a few phone calls and letters sent to Minnesota addresses.
Moreover, the contacts were “not directly connected to the underlying
action and did not occur until eight months after the contact,” which led
188
to the paternity action.
189
In contrast to these decisions is Hughs ex rel. Praul v. Cole,
190
which was discussed earlier in regard to Minnesota’s long-arm statute.
In Cole, the mother sought an order of protection on behalf of a child,
who was allegedly physically abused by his nonresident father during
out-of-state visits. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that personal
jurisdiction could be asserted over a nonresident father consistent with
due process based solely on child’s suffering the effects of abuse in
Minnesota and minimum contacts associated with father’s relationship
with his son.
180. 409 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), aff’d, 426 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1988).
181. Id. at 908.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 909-10.
184. 419 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
185. Id. at 118.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 119 (citing West American Insurance Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d
676, 679 (Minn. 1983) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 297 (1980))).
188. Id.
189. 572 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
190. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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Although one understands the concern courts have with situations
such as those found in Cole, the reasoning supporting the proposition that
personal jurisdiction can be exercised over the nonresident father is not
particularly strong. For example, it is doubtful that a court would allow
Minnesota to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident where the
nonresident and the Minnesota resident were involved in an auto accident
in the nonresident’s state and the nonresident had no contact in
Minnesota. However, because the action in Cole involved child abuse,
the court concluded there was jurisdiction, suggesting that jurisdiction
may turn on the nature of the cause of action.
In contrast to Minnesota, California has held that a single sexual
encounter between a citizen and an out-of-state citizen that results in a
parentage claim provides sufficient minimum contacts to give its courts
personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state citizen. For example, in
191
County of Humboldt v. Harris
a child was conceived when the
192
While the
plaintiff and father had intercourse in California in 1984.
father admitted the sexual encounter, he maintained that since 1982 he
had been a resident of Nevada and that California could not exercise
193
personal jurisdiction over him.
The California Court of Appeals
194
It observed that under Section 7007, a part of the Uniform
disagreed.
Parentage Act, which is codified in California, that “[a] person who has
sexual intercourse in this state thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to an action brought under this part with respect to
195
a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse.”
It
also observed that the sexual act imposed a substantial burden upon the
196
plaintiff and, where the plaintiff is impecunious, upon the state.
Furthermore, the court held that application of the statute was not barred
197
by the due process clause.
California’s reasoning appears more
persuasive on this point than that of Minnesota—a single sexual
encounter in Minnesota should subject the alleged putative father to an
action to establish support in this state. This is an area that Minnesota
should revisit.

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

254 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
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XIX. UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
Jurisdiction. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
198
generally applies to interstate child and spousal-support
(UIFSA)
199
orders.
Its purpose is to unify state laws relating to the establishment,
200
A Minnesota
enforcement, and modification of child support orders.
court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident in an action to modify
a support order if the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state
by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive
document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal
201
jurisdiction.
When a foreign support order exists, a Minnesota court
may modify it only if it finds, among other things, that (1) the child, the
obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state; and (2) the
202
petitioner is a nonresident of Minnesota.
Continuing Jurisdiction. A Minnesota district court has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over an existing child support order until all of the
parties who are individuals have filed written consents with the court for
a tribunal of another state to modify the order and assume continuing,
203
Minnesota may lose its continuing, exclusive
exclusive jurisdiction.
jurisdiction with regard to prospective enforcement of an order issued in
this state if the Minnesota child support order is modified by a tribunal of
204
another state with substantially similar laws.
Long-arm Provisions. UIFSA also creates a domestic dispute longarm statute, which gives state courts personal jurisdiction over a
205
nonresident that is as broad as constitutionally permitted.
The longarm statute applies to both spousal and child support. Proponents of
UIFSA contend that use of the long-arm statute would make initiation of
a case easier, provide greater access to information about the status of the
198. MINN. STAT. § 518C (2002).
199. MINN. STAT. § 518C.301 (2002).
200. Kasdan v. Berney, 587 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 518C.901 (1996); See also Virginia v. Richter, 475 S.E.2d 817, 819 (Va. Ct. App.
1996) (stating UIFSA intended to establish and enforce child support orders across state
lines) (citing John J. Sampson, UIFSA: An Interstate Support Act for the 21st Century, 27
FAM. L.Q. 85, 86 (1993)).
201. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(2) (2002).
202. MINN. STAT. § 518C.611(a)(1)(i)-(ii); see Rivera v. Ramsey County, 615
N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that if neither of the parents nor the
child resides in the state that issued an existing child-support order, a court in another
state may modify a properly registered order).
203. MINN. STAT. § 518C.205(a) (2002).
204. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.205(c) (2002).
205. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201 (2002).
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case, and give continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to only one state at any
one time.
Where long-arm jurisdiction cannot be obtained, UIFSA creates a
206
two-state proceeding to obtain support.
UIFSA has created special
rules on evidence and provides assistance with discovery procedures
where its long-arm provisions are utilized. It also attempts to identify the
roles for a forum state tribunal and to set up a one-order system.
Stipulating Jurisdiction. Parties may not confer subject matter
207
jurisdiction under the UIFSA on a Minnesota court by stipulation.
However, under Minnesota Statutes section 518C.204, Minnesota
possesses jurisdiction over a foreign support order if the parties do not
reside in the issuing state, the petitioner is a nonresident seeking
modification, and the respondent is subject to personal jurisdiction in
208
Therefore, to exercise jurisdiction under this statute, one
Minnesota.
must establish whether section 518C.204(a) or section 518C.204(b)
209
applies, and then apply the appropriate statutory provision to the facts.
Registering an Order Under UIFSA. Minnesota allows the
210
registration of a support order from another state “for enforcement.”
Among the procedural prerequisites for registration is the filing of a
206. MINN. STAT. § 518C.204 (2002).
207. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by stipulation. State ex rel.
Farrington v. Rigg, 259 Minn. 483, 485, 107 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1961).
208. Minnesota law provides the following guidance concerning jurisdiction when
there are simultaneous proceedings in another state:
(a) A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to establish a support
order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed after a petition or
comparable pleading is filed in another state only if:
(1) the petition or comparable pleading in this state is filed before the
expiration of the time allowed in the other state for filing a responsive
pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in the
other state; and
(3) if relevant, this state is the home state of the child.
(b) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a support
order if the petition or comparable pleading is filed before a petition or
comparable pleading is filed in another state if:
(1) the petition or comparable pleading in the other state is filed before the
expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a responsive pleading
challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction in this
state; and
(3) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the child.
MINN. STAT. § 518C.204 (2002).
209. Id.
210. MINN. STAT. § 518C.601 (2002).
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sworn or certified statement “showing the amount of any arrearage.”
What Constitutes a Petition? A request for registration of a foreign
child support order is distinct from, and does not constitute, a “petition”
for enforcement or modification, within the meaning of a UIFSA
provision establishing when a Minnesota court may exercise jurisdiction
to establish a support order after a petition or comparable pleading is
212
filed in another state.
If neither of the parents nor the child resides in
the state that issued an existing child-support order, a court in another
213
state may modify a properly registered order.
UIFSA appears to be
functioning quite well in Minnesota with no provisions needing
imminent attention.
XX. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
Minnesota adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) for all custody issues raised after Jan. 1,
214
The uniform custody laws were established to resolve
2000.
jurisdictional issues involving interstate child-custody disputes and must
215
be interpreted accordingly.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Decision. A
Minnesota court may modify another state’s custody determination if
Minnesota is currently the child’s home state and the other state no
216
longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.
Minnesota has approached the issue of modifying a foreign court’s
217
custody ruling with caution. For example, in Schroeder v. Schroeder
the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify a
support order, and that the father did not waive his right to challenge the
211. MINN. STAT. § 518C.602(a)(3) (2002).
212. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518C.204 (West 2002) (citing Kasden v. Berney, 587
N.W.2d 319 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)).
213. See Rivera v. Ramsey County, 615 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(stating that a Minnesota court could modify a Puerto Rico order because Puerto Rico is
no longer the child’s nor the parents’ state of residence, and consequently Puerto Rico no
longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(i) (providing
that a party seeking to modify in one state a child-support order issued in another state
may only register the order for modification “[i]f there is no individual contestant or child
residing in the issuing State”).
214. MINN. STAT. §§ 518D.101-.317 (2002).
215. See Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628, 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (noting
purpose of UCCJA as formerly codified under MINN. STAT. § 518A.01, subd. 1(a)
(1992)).
216. MINN. STAT. § 518D.203 (2002).
217. 658 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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218

district court’s decision finding jurisdiction to modify the order.
At
the time of dissolution, the father was living in California and mother
219
was living in Minnesota.
Pursuant to a stipulated order entered in
California, the “father was granted physical custody of the parties’ minor
child subject to the mother’s reasonable visitation and the mother was
220
required to pay child support.”
“The child resided in California until
November 1999, when he refused to return to [his] father following a
221
visit with [his] mother in Minnesota.”
The mother subsequently filed a motion in Minnesota to modify the
222
California order.
She asked for physical custody of the child and
223
The father argued that
termination of her support obligation.
California had continuing exclusive subject matter jurisdiction and the
224
court of appeals agreed with him.
The court observed that:
The UCCJEA provides that the state issuing a custody decree
will generally retain exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the
decree as long as that state remains the residence of the
children or a parent. Minn. Stat. § 518D.202, .203(2); Cal.
Fam. Code § 3422. It is undisputed that father is still a resident
of California. The Minnesota court therefore lacks subject
225
matter jurisdiction to modify the California custody order.
The court also rejected the mother’s argument that the child’s father
had waived a challenge to Minnesota jurisdiction by failing to object to
226
It reasoned that the “[f]ather could not confer
the registration order.
subject matter jurisdiction to the district court either by waiver or
227
consent.”
Home State Jurisdiction. Minnesota has jurisdiction to modify an
out-of-state custody or visitation determination where Minnesota is
currently the home state of the custodial parent and the child or
218. Id. at 912.
219. Id. at 911.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 518D (2002); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3400-25 (West
2002)).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 912.
227. Id. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.08(c) “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action.” See also Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 529 N.W.2d 429,
432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time, including for the first time on appeal”) (citations omitted).
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228

children.
Emergency Jurisdiction. Minnesota may exercise temporary
emergency jurisdiction if a child is present in this state and has been
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because
the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened
229
with mistreatment or abuse.
An unresolved issue involves whether
emergency jurisdiction may be exercised by a Minnesota court upon a
finding of abuse or mistreatment where the child is not present in the
230
state. In Beier v. Beier, the court held that a Minnesota court could
not exercise emergency jurisdiction where the child was not present in
231
This decision was made under the predecessor to the
Minnesota.
232
UCCJEA
and some have suggested that the UCCJEA removed the
dual requirement of presence in the state together with emergency
circumstances. This argument will most likely not prevail, however,
because of the language of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
233
(PKPA) directed at temporary emergency jurisdiction.
The PKPA
states that a custody determination can be made by a state if it has
jurisdiction under state law and the child is physically present in such
[s]tate and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or
234
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
This language is clear and it
preempts Minnesota from exercising emergency jurisdiction.
Exercising Jurisdiction over Visitation Issues. Under the UCCJEA,
Minnesota can take jurisdiction over a visitation issue only if the foreign
visitation order has been registered in a Minnesota court in accordance
235
Other custody matters involving a foreign order
with the UCCJEA.
should also not be considered absent proper registration under the

228. Stone v. Stone, 636 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see MINN. STAT.
§§ 518D.102(h), .201(a)(1), .202 (2002) (providing Minnesota with jurisdiction to make a
child-custody determination if Minnesota is the child’s home state, defined as the state
where the child has lived for at least six consecutive months before commencement of
proceedings).
229. MINN. STAT. § 518D.204(a) (2002); see Schmidt v. Schmidt, 436 N.W.2d 99,
104 (Minn. 1989) (stating “emergency” jurisdiction is available only where the child has
been subjected to or threatened by abuse).
230. 371 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
231. Id. at 55-56.
232. MINN. STAT.. § 518A.03, subd. 1(c) (1998) (repealed Jan. 1, 2000 by 1999
Minn. Laws ch. 74, art. 3, § 18).
233. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(C) (2000).
234. Id.
235. See MINN. STAT. § 518D.305(a) (2002) (establishing registration procedures).
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236

UCCJEA.
Continuing Jurisdiction. The UCCJEA provides that the state
issuing a custody decree will generally retain exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over the decree as long as that state remains the residence of
237
the children or a parent.
The foreign court does not lose its
jurisdiction over the matter merely because a party fails to challenge the
238
registration of the judgment in Minnesota.
Personal Jurisdiction. A majority of jurisdictions that have
considered the question have concluded that the UCCJEA’s rational
scheme assigning default jurisdiction to a child’s home state does not
require that state to have personal jurisdiction over both parents of the
child in order to make a parental rights termination decision.
XXI. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION—AMERICANS
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 is an important jurisdictional
statute. The ICWA §§ 191 and 195 provide tribal courts with exclusive
jurisdiction over proceedings concerning an Indian child who resides or
239
is domiciled on an Indian reservation. In Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, the U.S. Supreme Court held that custody and
adoption decisions involving Indian children born off an Indian
reservation to parents who were domiciled on the reservation at the time
of birth gave the tribe to which the parents belonged exclusive
240
jurisdiction to decide those issues.
Domicile was defined as physical
241
Minors will take
presence with the intent to remain on the reservation.
the domicile of their parents because they are legally incapable of
242
forming the requisite state-of-mind (intent) to create a domicile.
The
Court made it clear that parents could not defeat the intent of the ICWA
243
absent changing their domicile.
Minnesota courts do not have jurisdiction over matters on Indian

236. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
237. MINN. STAT. § 518D.202, .203(2) (2002).
238. Schroeder v. Schroeder, 658 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); see
MINN. STAT. § 518D.305(c)(3) (2002) (reading in part: “failure to contest the registration
[within 20 days] will result in confirmation of the child custody determination and
preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have
been asserted”).
239. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 52-53 (1989).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 48 (citing Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424 (1939)).
242. Id. (citing Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933)).
243. Id. at 52-53.
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reservations unless Congress has specifically granted such jurisdiction to
244
Public Law 280 eliminated most federal restrictions on state
the state.
court jurisdiction in paternity and child support cases involving one or
more Indians where state court jurisdiction does not interfere with Indian
245
self-governance. The Federal Act authorizes state court assumption of
jurisdiction over civil causes of action where Indians are parties.
When Congress passed Public Law 280, it granted Minnesota
general jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions on Indian
246
reservations.
However, the Red Lake Indian Reservation was
247
explicitly excluded from this grant of general jurisdiction.
Despite the Red Lake Band’s unique status, Minnesota has subject
matter jurisdiction over persons normally under the jurisdiction of the
248
Band when they are off the reservation but within the state.
However,
in the absence of a compelling state interest, the state will not exercise its
jurisdictional authority over members of the Red Lake Band found offreservation when such action will undermine the Band’s efforts to
249
achieve effective self-government.
250
To illustrate this point, consider Desjarlait v. Desjarlait
where
Minnesota asserted subject matter jurisdiction over a custody suit
251
The court gave three reasons for its
involving Indian parents.
decision: (1) the tribal court relinquished jurisdiction over custody; (2)
the Indian father, who later claimed lack of state court jurisdiction,
initially commenced the dissolution matter in state court rather than tribal
court; and (3) the Indian mother and children resided off the
252
reservation.

244. In re K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Red Lake
Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 311 Minn. 241, 247, 48 N.W.2d 722, 726 (1976);
Sigana v. Bailey, 282 Minn. 367, 369, 164 N.W.2d 886, 888 (1960); see Recent Case,
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. State, 248 N.W.2d 722 (1976), 4 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 454, 455-56 (1978)).
245. Becker County Welfare Dep’t v. Bellcourt, 453 N.W.2d 543, 544 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (citing Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 589 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C.A. § 1360 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989))).
246. In re K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d at 815 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1988) (granting
criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988) (granting civil jurisdiction)).
247. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1953); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1953)).
248. Id. (citing Red Lake Band, 311 Minn. at 247, 248 N.W.2d at 726).
249. Id. (citing State v. Red Lake DFL Comm., 303 N.W.2d 54, 55 (Minn. 1981)
(quoting Red Lake Band, 311 Minn. at 248, 248 N.W.2d at 727)).
250. 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
251. Id. at 142-43.
252. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/9

44

Oliphant: Essay: Jurisdiction in Family Law Matters: The Minnesota Perspect
9 OLIPHANT - PAGINATED.DOC

1/13/2004 4:26 PM

2003] MINNESOTA JURISDICTION IN FAMILY LAW MATTERS

601

253

In contrast, in In re K.K.S., the court ruled it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to decide custody of minor children and supported its
decision with three reasons: (1) the Red Lake Nation tribal court has
exercised jurisdiction over the custody matter of the child, (2) the Indian
mother had never submitted to the authority of a Minnesota court, and
(3) the non-Indian father had subjected himself to the authority of the
tribal court when he chose to live on the reservation with the child and its
mother.254
Minnesota’s interest in a custody dispute is not always
overshadowed by tribal sovereignty—especially where the dispute
occurs off the Indian reservation. Physical presence off the reservation
and a compelling state interest in a child’s welfare may justify Minnesota
exercising initial jurisdiction in a custody dispute between an Indian and
255
non-Indian.
Neither federal law nor public policy preempts state
power over interparental child custody disputes where the Indian child
256
and at least one parent reside off the reservation.
Where a tribal court and a state court share authority over a custody
dispute such as in K.K.S., the state court’s decision to decline jurisdiction
in favor of the tribal court is proper for several reasons. First, doing
257
otherwise may encourage parental kidnapping.
Second, dismissing
the state court action eliminates the possibility of conflicting decrees that
would undermine the authority of both the tribal and state courts and
258
disrupt the lives of the mother, father and child.
Third, declining
jurisdiction in favor of the tribal court recognizes the cultural identity of
a child like K.K.S. and promotes tribal integrity by acknowledging that

253. 508 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
254 Id. at 816.
255. Id. (citing Red Lake Band, 311 Minn. at 247, 248 N.W.2d at 726).
256. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988) (Indian Child Welfare Act by its terms
does not apply to interparental custody disputes); Barbara A. Atwood, Fighting Over
Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV.
1051, 1075 (1989) (stating Public Law 280 does not adequately resolve jurisdictional
disputes in certain cases)).
257. Id. (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, §
7(c), 94 stat. 3566, 3569 (1980) (one purpose of the Act is to deter abductions by basing
jurisdiction on a child’s connections with a state rather than mere presence in it); MINN.
STAT. § 518A.01 (1992) (one purpose of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is to
deter abductions)).
258. Id. (citing Fisher v. District Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 388 (1976) (“[State court
jurisdiction] would create a substantial risk of conflicting adjudications affecting the
custody of the child and would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of the
Tribal Court.”)).
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children are vital to the continued existence of a tribe.
Fourth, a
decision favoring the tribal court is consistent with the federal policy of
260
encouraging tribal autonomy.
Finally, such a ruling satisfies the
parens patriae role of both the state and the tribe in protecting the
261
welfare of the child.
XXII. PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
One of the thorniest problems faced by state courts involves
interstate custody disputes. Although a majority of states have adopted
some form of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA), the preemptive nature of federal law should not be
ignored. To the extent that a state custody statute conflicts with federal
law, the latter will always prevail.
Because the states were unable to agree on a uniform application of
principles among them, non-custodial parents sometimes exploited the
situation by forcibly taking children from the state issuing the custody
decree to another state with less-stringent jurisdictional requirements. To
discourage that activity and to allocate powers and duties among courts
of different states, in 1980 Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping
262
Prevention Act (PKPA).
The Act applies to criminal civil proceedings
263
Essentially, PKPA
including disputes involving interstate custody.
favors continuing jurisdiction in the original state, provided that such
state initially acted in compliance with PKPA. If it did so, a second state
may not exercise jurisdiction and must give full faith and credit to the
custody order of the first state. The second state must enforce the order

259. Id. at 816-17 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1988) (finding “there is no resource
that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their
children”); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988) (finding state exercise of jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings often fails “to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families”)).
260. Id. at 817 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988)).
261. Id. (citing MINN. STAT § 518A.03, subd. 1 (1992) (repealed Jan. 1, 2000 by
1999 Minn. Laws c. 74, art. 3 § 18) (recognizing Minnesota’s interest in protecting the
interests of the child); RED LAKE TRIBAL CODE § 801.13 (date unknown) (recognizing
tribe’s interest)).
262. In re Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) rev’d 890 P.2d 647
(Colo. 1995) (citing Russell M. Coombs, Progress Under the PKPA, 6 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 59 (1990)).
263. See Anne B. Goldstein, Tragedy of the Interstate Child: A Critical
Reexamination of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 845, 849-50 (1992).
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and may not modify it unless the original state has lost or declines
jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that under the
provisions of the PKPA, once a state properly exercises jurisdiction,
other states must give full faith and credit to the determination and no
other state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction even if it would be
entitled to do so under its own laws. The Court has stated that Congress’
chief aim in enacting the PKPA was to extend the Full Faith and Credit
264
Clause to custody determinations.
The effect of § 1738A(d) and §
1738A(f) of the PKPA is to limit custody jurisdiction to the first state to
properly enter a custody order, as long as certain requirements are met.
The Act defines a federal standard for continuing exclusive custody
jurisdiction. The first state must have possessed initial custody
jurisdiction when it entered its first order (according to criteria in the
Act) and it must remain “the residence of the child or any contestant”
when it later modifies that order.
PKPA incorporates a state law inquiry. In order to retain exclusive
responsibility for modifying a prior custody order, the first state must
still have custody jurisdiction as a matter of its own custody law.
However, if the federal and state criteria for continuing jurisdiction are
met, the first state can, if it decides to do so, relinquish jurisdiction in
favor of a court better situated to assess the child’s needs.
To retain jurisdiction under the PKPA, a state must have initially
obtained and must continue to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with its
own laws. In addition, a state must also meet one of the five enumerated
265
jurisdictional conditions of the PKPA.
Once the original state has
made a custody determination, another state may modify the
determination only if it has jurisdiction and “the court of the other State
no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction
266
to modify such determination.”
Persons who “snatch” children may be criminally prosecuted under

264. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 183 (1988).
265. The first four (home state, if no home state then significant connection and
substantial evidence, abandonment or neglect, no other state claims jurisdiction and
asserting jurisdiction is in the child’s best interests) are essentially the same as the four
jurisdictional provisions of the UCCJEA. The fifth condition is that a court making a
determination through exercise of one of the first four conditions retains a legally
sufficient tie to the case as long as that court keeps jurisdiction under its own laws and
remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(f)(2) (2000).
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267

PKPA.
A federal warrant for unlawful flight is available to the
custodial parent for illegal child snatching and permits the intervention of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in such instances.
XXIII. SOLDIERS’ AND SAILORS’ RELIEF ACT
The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 tolls the period
in which a party must assert the nonexistence of the parent and child
relationship during the time the member of the military was on active
duty. The Act provides:
The period of military service shall not be included in
computing any period . . . for the bringing of any action or
proceeding in any court . . . whether such cause of action or the
right or privilege to institute such action or proceeding shall
268
have accrued prior to or during the periods of such service.
A presumed father who is in the military service is entitled to
269
270
In Jackson v. Jackson,
the Minnesota
protection from the Act.
Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in holding that a military serviceman was not entitled to stay
child support proceedings while overseas because his presence was
unnecessary and evidence could fairly and more expeditiously be
271
presented by affidavits and documentary evidence.
However, before
moving forward at a family law hearing without the presence of a
member of the military, the court must make a specific finding that the
absence of the service person does not materially affect his or her ability
272
to conduct a defense under the Act.
273
Jackson v. Jackson was decided before Conroy v. Aniskoff, which
casts doubt upon it. In Conroy v. Aniskoff, the United States Supreme
Court held that a member of the armed services is not required to show
that his military service prejudiced his ability to bring an action in order
274
for section 525 of the Act to toll the limitations period.
The Court
construed the provision to protect “all military personnel on active
275
The critical factor in these cases is military service, and once
duty.”
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
50 U.S.C. app. § 525 (1988).
See id.
403 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 251.
See id at 250-51.
507 U.S. 511 (1993).
Id. at 512-13, 518.
Id. at 515.
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shown, the period of limitations may be tolled for the duration of the
276
military service.
XXIV. FAMILY DISPUTES IN FEDERAL COURT—
SUBJECT MATTER LIMITS
It is a well-accepted principle that federal courts are courts of
277
In addition to the general limits
limited subject matter jurisdiction.
applied to federal courts in civil actions, there are additional limitations
when domestic matters are concerned. The added limitations arise from
the “domestic relations exception” that was birthed in the nineteenth
278
century. It first appeared in an 1858 decision, Barber v. Barber,
where the United States Supreme Court declared that federal courts are
without power to hear disputes based upon diversity jurisdiction
279
involving “the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony.”
The Court did not clearly explain the basis for the exception, but since its
decision in Barber the exception has been refined.
The exception is based on the history underlying the congressional
grant of power to the federal courts and on the policy consideration that
states have traditionally adjudicated marital and child custody disputes
280
due to competence and expertise in adjudicating such matters.
It is
also thought that state courts are peculiarly suited to enforce state
regulations and domestic relations decrees involving alimony and child
custody, particularly because such decrees often demand substantial
281
continuing judicial oversight.
State courts also have close connections
to local agencies, which resolve conflicts resulting from domestic
decrees. Because the state courts are accustomed to handling these
cases, they are probably better handled in that venue.
The domestic relations exception was delineated in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, where the Court stated that federal courts are divested of the
power to issue divorce decree awards, alimony, and child custody
282
orders.
Because the limitation is one of subject matter jurisdiction, it
276. Bickford v. United States, 656 F.2d 636, 639 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (citing Ricard v.
Birch, 529 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1975).
277. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (regarding federal question), 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1) (2000) (regarding diversity actions between citizens of different states
involving matters in controversy exceeding $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest).
278. 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
279. Id. at 584.
280. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695-701 (1992).
281. See Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1981).
282. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703.
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is not waivable.
The Court in Ankenbrandt narrowly limited the exception. Lawsuits
affecting domestic relations, however substantial, are not within the
exception unless the claim at issue is one to obtain a divorce or establish
alimony or child custody. This narrow construction led the Court to hold
that the exception did not apply to tort claims despite their intimate
283
connection to family affairs.
While some lower federal courts had permitted declarative actions
284
involving the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
to be heard,
especially where there were conflicting decisions by state courts on the
custody of a minor child, the United States Supreme Court ended such
actions. In an opinion without dissent, it held that federal courts may not
play an enforcement role when two states disagree over which parent
285
should have custody of a child.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has heard a few domestic
disputes. It has stated that, in general, “disputes over the custody of
286
children are not subject to federal jurisdiction.”
It has also rejected
civil rights claims brought against lawyers, judges, litigants, and others
where the allegation is that they are responsible for the plaintiff’s loss of
287
custody of the minor children involved in a divorce.
In a family
decision affecting child support in Minnesota, it rejected a constitutional
attack on the Federal Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), and joined
288
several other circuits that have also rejected such an attack.
XXV. ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL COURT
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available in a
federal court, and despite the fact it has subject matter jurisdiction, it may
abstain from hearing the case. The United States Supreme Court has
283. See id. at 704.
284. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
285. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988).
286. Robinson v. Eng, 989 F.2d 505 (table), 1993 WL 51808 at *1 (8th Cir. (Neb.)
Jan. 11, 1993) (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. 689). “Parents do not have an absolute
unabridgeable constitutional right to the custody of their children.” Id. (citing Ruffalo v.
Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983)).
287. Id.
288. See United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing
United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 479-81 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Parker,
108 F.3d 28, 29-31 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1030-33
(1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1001-04 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sage, 92
F.3d 101, 104-07 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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suggested that abstention “might be relevant in a case involving elements
of the domestic relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce,
alimony, or child custody.”289 This would be so when a case presents
“‘difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of
substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the
290
291
case then at bar.’ ”
In Younger v. Harris,
the Supreme Court
required that a federal court abstain from enjoining a pending state
criminal proceeding. In Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden
292
State Bar Ass’n., the Court applied Younger to non-criminal judicial
proceedings where important state interests are involved. Later, the
Court extended the Younger principles to state civil proceedings. In
293
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., the Court held that federal courts must
abstain from hearing challenges to pending state proceedings where the
state’s interest is so important that exercising federal jurisdiction would
294
disrupt the comity between federal and state courts.
Younger requires
federal courts to abstain where: (1) state proceedings are pending, (2) the
state proceedings involve an important state interest, and (3) the state
proceedings will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his
295
constitutional claims.
XXVI. PARTITION ACTIONS
Occasionally, a Minnesota court is asked to award an interest in
land located within its borders but it lacks personal jurisdiction over one
296
297
party.
Typically, this problem triggers a partition action.
The
298
Minnesota Supreme Court held in Searles v. Searles that Minnesota
had jurisdiction to hear an action to partition land located within the state
even though the parties to the dispute were married and divorced in
299
Missouri and neither was a resident or domiciled here.
289. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 690 (1992)
290. Id. at 705-06 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
291. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
292. 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
293. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
294. Id. at 10.
295. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-52.
296. See, e.g., Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 363, 24 N.W.2d 711, 712 (1946)
(stating “in divorce action, the parties’ marriage status, and not their cohabitation,
furnishes the subject matter of the court’s jurisdiction.”).
297. Partition actions are brought pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 558.01 (1986).
298. 420 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. 1988), aff’g 412 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
299. Id. at 584.
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The disputed Minnesota property had been acquired during the
parties’ marriage, which was dissolved by a Missouri court in 1971.
However, their divorce decree failed to deal with distribution of any real
estate. Years later the ex-wife discovered the existence of the land in
Minnesota and initiated a partition action. While holding that Minnesota
had in rem jurisdiction to hear the partition action, the court raised but
left unanswered the question of whether Minnesota should dismiss the
action on the ground of forum non conveniens. The court observed that
dissolution of the marriage under the Missouri decree did not extinguish
the ex-wife’s claim to a marital interest in the Minnesota real estate. The
300
court found support for this view in Grodzicki v. Quast,
where a
Florida divorce decree had failed to dispose of the parties’ property and
the court held that Minnesota could dispose of it.
The court underscored the importance of closely examining the
legal theory upon which a party seeking a partition based upon a foreign
divorce decree is proceeding. For example, if the party asserts that
recovery is warranted because certain marital property was omitted from
a dissolution decree, it is doubtful that Minnesota has jurisdiction to hear
the action because nothing in the marriage relationship involved
Minnesota, i.e., the couple were married, resided for their married life,
and divorced outside the state. However, if the party seeking a partition
pursues the action on the basis that Minnesota has in rem jurisdiction
over Minnesota land for partition purposes and sculpts the lawsuit as
seeking an interest in land, then courts will probably hear it. The
rationale is that in rem jurisdiction includes the right to determine title
and ownership to the land as a condition precedent to dividing or
301
ordering its sale.
XXVII. ENFORCING OUT-OF-STATE JUDGMENTS
Minnesota has jurisdiction to handle domestic disputes based on
out-of-state judgments if both parties reside in Minnesota. Furthermore,
it may, in certain situations, apply its own domestic law to resolve a
dispute rather than the law of the state where the judgment was originally
entered.
302
For example, both parties in Hodges v. Hodges
had moved to
300. 276 Minn. 34, 149 N.W.2d 8 (1967).
301. The court noted that although the trial court had jurisdiction, it possessed the
discretion to refuse to hear the matter on the basis that Minnesota was an inconvenient
forum. See id. at 39, 149 N.W.2d at 12.
302. 415 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Minnesota following their 1971 Indiana divorce. The ex-wife brought a
motion asking Minnesota to modify the Indiana maintenance award.
Minnesota law allowed the motion, while Indiana did not. Therefore, if
Minnesota refused to hear the ex-wife’s motion, she was foreclosed from
obtaining a change in support. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held
303
that Minnesota had jurisdiction to modify the judgment.
It justified its
decision in part on the lengthy period the couple had lived outside
Indiana and in Minnesota.
The standard for giving full faith and credit to a foreign judgment is
304
found in Roche v. McDonald.
It is settled that the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution requires that the judgment of a State court, which
had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter in suit,
305
Furthermore,
shall be given effect in every other State.
decisions shall be equally conclusive upon the merits. Only
such defenses as would be good to a suit thereon in that State
306
Final
can be relied on in the courts of any other State.
judgments should be accorded full faith and credit by the
307
various states.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution
requires recognition and enforcement of alimony payments accrued
under an inalterable judgment for a specific amount of money rendered
308
The judgment and decree are final for the
in another jurisdiction.
purposes of full faith and credit, subject to the usual grounds for vacation
309
Problems occur, however, if the foreign
of a money judgment.
303. Id. at 66 (citing Rudolf v. Rudolf, 48 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1984)). The court
justified its decision in part on the lengthy period the couple had lived outside Indiana
and in Minnesota. Id. at 67.
304. 275 U.S. 449 (1928).
305. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
306. Id. (citation omitted).
307. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 at 25-26. See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220,
234 (1946); Donald P. Barrett, Note, Constitutional Law: Due Process: Requirement of
Notice Before Enforcing Judgment for Arrears of Alimony Payable in Installments, 34
CAL. L. REV. 760, 762-63 (1946); Recent Case, Constitutional Law—Due Process—
Conflict of Laws—Recognition of Foreign Ex Parte Judgment for Arrears of Alimony, 31
MINN. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1946-47); see also Haas v. Haas, 282 Minn. 420, 422-23, 165
N.W.2d 240, 242-43 (1969) (citing Anderson v. Lyons, 226 Minn. 330, 32 N.W.2d 849
(1948); Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922)), overruled on other
grounds by Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502 (Minn. 1981).
308. See Rudolf v. Rudolf, 348 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Minn. 1984); see also Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, MINN. STAT. § 548.26-.33 (2000).
309. Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502, 505 (Minn. 1981) (citing Haas v. Haas,
282 Minn. 420, 165 N.W.2d 240; Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542
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alimony decree is not final or if it may be modified either as to future or
310
past installments.
311
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA)
provides a speedy and economical method of enforcing a foreign
312
It relieves creditors and debtors alike from the costs and
judgment.
313
harassment of additional litigation.
The procedure is optional and
314
does not impair the existing remedies available to a judgment creditor.
Judgments that meet the definition in Minnesota Statutes section
315
548.26 may be filed under the Uniform Act.
A foreign judgment filed
under the Uniform Act is essentially converted to a Minnesota judgment
316
when the provisions of the statute are followed.
XXVIII. CONCLUSION
This article has surveyed, analyzed, and commented on subject
matter and personal jurisdiction issues in the family law area from the
perspective of the Minnesota legal system. In general, the Minnesota
(1992)).
310. Shulman v. Miller, 191 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Wis. 1961); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109 (1971); see Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S.
287, 290 (1945); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544-45 (1948); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,
354 U.S. 416, 517-18 (1957); Krauspkopf, Divisible Divorce and Rights to Support,
Property and Custody, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 346 (1963); Recent Case, Conflict of Laws—
Divorce—Enforcement of Prior Separation Maintenance Decree, 33 MINN. L. REV. 307
(1949).
311. MINN. STAT. § 548.26-33 (2000).
312. Ehrenzweig v. Ehrenzweig, 383 N.Y.S.2d 487, 492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d,
402 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978). See Light v. Light, 147 N.E.2d 34, 37 (Ill.
1958); Comment, According Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Modifiable Alimony
Decrees, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 136, 150 (1958-59).
313. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 13 U.L.A. 173-74 (1980).
314. MINN. STAT. § 548.31 (2002) “ ‘Foreign judgment’ means any judgment,
decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to
full faith and credit in this state.” MINN. STAT. § 548.26 (2002).
315. MINN. STAT. § 548.28 (2002).
316. See MINN. STAT. § 548.27 (2002).
A certified copy of any foreign judgment may be filed in the office of the court
administrator of any district court of this state. The court administrator shall
treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of any district
court or the supreme court of this state, and upon the filing of a certified copy
of a foreign judgment in the office of the court administrator of district court of
a county, it may not be filed in another district court in the state. A judgment
so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district court
or the supreme court of this state, and may be enforced or satisfied in like
manner. Id.
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legal system has done a good job. When jurisdiction is at issue,
Minnesota tends to remain within the mainstream of American
jurisprudence, although there are areas needing greater focus and
possible clarification.
For example, the literal interpretation given to Minnesota Statues
section 518.07 is troubling. Either the language in the statute should be
modified to reflect a modern-day understanding of such a provision or
the courts should revisit it with an eye toward revaluing their century-old
view of the application. There is little sense in allowing a judgment to be
reopened years after it was entered, and long after the parties have
litigated all of the issues in the dispute, because the court lacked what
today is characterized as subject matter jurisdiction. New York’s view of
a similar provision should be adopted.
It would also be useful to have two clear definitions in Chapter 518:
one for residence and a second for domicile. It would also be useful to
replace the existing general long-arm statute with language to the effect
that “Minnesota will exercise personal jurisdiction in all cases that do not
offend the Constitution of the United States.” There is little need for any
additional language in the long-arm statute.
There should also be a reexamination of the emerging role that
“status” may play in the personal jurisdiction area. With personal liberty
at stake, the examination should be very cautious.
Overall, there should be continued work on obtaining uniform
outcomes when faced with due process issues within the family context.
It is suggested that consistency in outcomes will be increased by
focusing only on the harm to the Minnesota child, and not on the conduct
of the parents, or where the child was born, or the nature of the claim
being made. A more straightforward rule of law will make it easier for
the bench and bar to reach uniform understanding in this area.
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